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Recent Cases
PREJUDGMENT GARNISHMENT OF WAGESA VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS?
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of Bay Viewl
Family Finance Corporation of Bay View brought suit against Christine Sniadach alleging a claim of 40 owing on a promissory note. The
finance company also instituted proceedings to garnish petitioner's wages
2
in accordance with the Wisconsin garnishment statute. Under this statute
the creditor, or his lawyer, after suit has been filed in an action based
on a contract,3 can file a complaint with the clerk of the court where suit
was filed 4 alleging: (1) that a summons has been issued in an action based
upon contract; (2) the amount of the claim; (3) that the creditor believes
that the garnishee is indebted to the defendant; and (4) that the indebtedness, to the best of the creditor's knowledge and belief, is not exempt from
execution. 5 The derk of the court then issues the garnishee summons which,
when served upon the garnishee by the creditor or his lawyer, has the
0
effect of freezing the defendant's wages resulting from one salary period,7
8
less a subsistence allowance, until after trial in the main action. 9 Though
the statute does provide for notice of the garnishment to be served upon
the debtor-defendant, he need not be notified that his wages have been
garnished until ten days after service of the writ upon the garnishee. 10
Sniadach moved that the garnishment proceedings be dismissed for
failure to satisfy the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. The trial court denied the motion and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court affirmed." The United States Supreme Court reversed and held
that absent provisions for notice and a prior hearing, the Wisconsin procedure allowing prejudgment garnishment of wages violates the fundamen12
tal principles of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
1. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.01-.24 (Supp. 1969).
3. Id. § 267.02.
4. Id. § 267.04.
5. Id. § 267.05.
6. Id. § 267.04.
7. Id. § 267.02.
8. Id. § 267.18. It has been noted that this subsistence allowance is "generally insufficient to support the debtor for any one week." Comment, 1967 Wis. L.
REv. 759, 767.
9. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.16 (Supp. 1969). Though the defendant may post
a bond and free the garnished portion of his wages under § 267.21, the Wisconsin
statute provides no means whereby the defendant can challenge the validity of
the garnishment until after trial on the main suit.
10. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.07 (Supp. 1969).
11. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N. W.
2d 259 (1967).
12. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 895 U.S. 37 (1969).
(405)
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Prior to the decision in Sniadach, it had generally been held that the
state statutes 13 regulating the provisional remedies of garnishment and
attachment 14 need not provide for either notice to the defendant or the
right to be heard.' 5 The rationale supporting this position was dearly
stated in Mclnnes v. McKay.16 In that case the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the Maine attachment statute' 7 under which his real
estate had been attached without providing him with the opportunity
for a hearing prior to the issuance of the writ. The Maine Supreme Court,
in upholding the statute, stated:
But, although an attachment may . .. deprive one of property,
yet conditionaland temporary as it is, and part of the legal remedy
and procedure by which the property of the debtor may be taken
in satisfaction of the debt, if judgment be recovered we do not
think it is the deprivation of property contemplated by the Constitution. And if it be, it is not a deprivation without "due process
of law" for it is a part of a process, which during its proceeding
gives notice and opportunity for hearing and judgment of some
judicial or other authorized tribunal. The requirements of "due
process of law" and "the law of the land" are satisfied.1 8
It is submitted that Mclnnes and similar holdings are not overruled
by Sniadach except to the extent their rationale may be read to authorize
prejudgment garnishment of wages without notice or a hearing. This
assumption rests on the fact that the Court, in the course of its opinion
in Sniadach not only reaffirmed the Mclnnes case,' 9 but distinguished
13. Garnishment exists only by statute. 6 Am. JuR. 2d Attachment and
Garnishment § 9 (1963); 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 1 (b) (1943). Therefore, it
is necessary to look to the statutes of a particular jurisdiction in order to find
the provisions which govern.
14. For the purposes of this note, the words garnishment and attachment
will not be distinguished. In a garnishment action the defendant's property which
is being "seized" is either an intangible debt owed to the defendant or is personal
property in the possession of a third party when the writ of garnishment is issued;
in an attachment action the defendant has retained possession of his property
at the time the attachment writ is issued. As this possession distinction has no
bearing upon the defendant's right to notice and hearing, the two terms will not
be distinguished within the context of this note. What will be distinguished is
the prejudgment garnishment of wages from other garnishments and attachments.
15. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 613 (1956); 16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 576 (1964). There appears to be no state statute which expressly
provides for both notice to the defendant and the right to a hearing before
issuance of a garnishment writ.
16. 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), affd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1928).
17. ME. REv. STAT. c. 86, § 2 et. seq., 69 (1916).
18. McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 116, 141 A. 699, 702 (1928) (emphasis
added). Accord, Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 198, 163 S.E. 845, 848 (1932),
where the court stated "[t]he attachment . ..has operated only to detain the
property temporarily, to await final judgment on the merit's (sic) of the plaintif's
claim. No Constitutional right is impaired," (emphasis added); Shell Oil Co. v.
Milne, 127 Vt. 249, 246 A. 2d 837 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 965 (1969) (wage
garnishment); Thompson v. Baker, 133 F. Supp. 247 (W.D. Ark. 1955) (wage
garnishment).
19. 395 U.S. at 340. The Court cited the Mclnnes case in support of the
proposition that though a procedural rule "may satisfy due process for attachments
in general," this does not mean that it satisfies procedural due process in every case.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/8
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wages as "a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in
our economic system."2 0 In further support of this distinction the Court
stated that garnishment proceedings of the Wisconsin type "may impose
tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support, '21 drive
a family "below the poverty level," 22 and may even compel the wage
earner, who is in dire need of his garnished wages, to "sign a new contract
of 'payment schedule' 23which incorporates" additional collection charges
such as attorney's fees.
It should also be noted that the holding in Sniadach is even more
limited by the Court's recognition that in "extraordinary situations" prejudgment garnishment of wages may well satisfy procedural due process,
provided the statute under which such procedure is to be taken is narrowly
drawn to meet such a situation. 2 4 Although the Court did not elaborate on
this point, it clearly suggested that garnishment of wages in order to obtain
jurisdiction over a non-resident would constitute an "extraordinary situation." 25 Other "extraordinary situations" that arguably justify prejudgment garnishment of wages would include those situations where the debtor
has taken, or threatens to take, an affirmative action solely for the purpose
of hindering his creditor. For example, if the defendant conceals or threatens to conceal his assets, leaves or threatens to leave the jurisdiction or
divests or threatens to divest himself of his assets, merely to prevent his
creditor from recovery on a later won judgment, this would constitute an
"extraordinary situation." The creditor would therefore be allowed to
garnish the defendant's wages before judgment thus protecting himself
from the acts of the defendant. It would also have the effect of discouraging
such action on the part of the defendant.
On the other hand, it seems doubtful if an allegation such as that
required by the Florida statute to the effect that
the debt.., is just, due, and unpaid, that the garnishment is not
sued out to injure either defendant or garnishee, and that . . .
[the plaintiff] does not believe that defendant will have . . .
visible property in this state . . . on which a levy can be made
sufficient to satisfy plaintiff's claim 2 6
would constitute an "extraordinary situation." This conclusion is based
upon the fact that if such an allegation were true, the plaintiff could, in
most cases, have discovered the defendant's lack of property through the
use of reasonable care in investigating the defendant's security before
issuing credit. To allow such a situation to be considered extraordinary,
thus allowing prejudgment garnishment of wages, would permit the plain20. 395 U.S. at 340
21. Id.
22. Id. In support of this proposition the Court cited the remarks of Representative Reuss in 114 CONG. REc. 688 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1968).
23. 395 U.S. at 341 citing Comment, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 743, 753 (1968).
24. 395 U.S. at 839.
25. Id. The Court specifically pointed out that in this case "[p]etitioner was a
resident of this Wisconsin community and in personam jurisdiction was readily
obtainable."
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 77.031 (1967).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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tiff to disregard his own lack of care. Also, it is unlikely that the defendant
who lacks tangible property will quit his job solely to avoid payment of
a judgment. Therefore, garnishment could safely be delayed until the
conclusion of the suit and issue only in aid of execution. Finally, an allegation similar to that of the Florida type does not imply any affirmative
wrong doing on the part of the defendant, nor that the garnishment writ
is issued solely to 27protect the plaintiff from such wrongful act on the part
of the defendant.
Though the opinion in Sniadach exhibited a definite distaste for prejudgment garnishment of wages, its effect in Missouri 28 is likely to be
nominal in comparison to that in states which allow prejudgment garnishment of wages on grounds similar to those necessary in Wisconsin and in
Florida. Missouri allows prejudgment garnishment only in aid of attachment. 20 In order to obtain a writ of attachment in Missouri, it is necessary
for the plaintiff to file an affidavit 30 stating that he has a just demand
and that he has good reason to believe and does believes' in the existence
of any one of fourteen statutory grounds which can be grouped as follows:
(1) grounds which are used by the court for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction; 32 or (2) grounds which imply wrong'doing on the part of the
defendant and thus constitute an "extraordinary situation;" 3 or (8) mis27. But see, Fahey v. Malonne, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), where the Court held
that the seizure of a bank by a conservator was not a violation of due process
even though neither notice nor opportunity for hearing was given the bank
managers. One justification given by the Court was that the bank stockholders
would realize no return from their investment in the bank if immediate action
was not taken. Thus, to protect the stockholders' interest, immediate seizure
was necessary in this extraordinary situation. The same rationale could be used
to argue that a statute similar to the Florida statute has the same basic purpose
as that upheld in the Fahey case, and the fact that the plaintiff may realize
nothing from his later judgment creates an extraordinary situation.
28. This is because "in some states it is common to garnish wages before
judgment; in Missouri it is not." Lauer, Modification of Wage Garnishment, 24
J. Mo. BAR 242, 248 (1968). There are a few states which will not be affected at
all since they do not allow prejudgment garnishment of wages in any situation.
See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2602(6) (Supp. 1965); MIcH. Comp. LAws
ANN. § 600.4011 (3) (1968); PA. STAT. tit. 12, R.C.P. Rule 1480 (1967); VA. CoDE
ANN. § 8-441 (1968).
29. § 525.010, .040, RSMo (1959); Mo. R Crv. P. 90.01, .03.
30. § 521.030, RSMo (1959); Mo. R. Civ. P. 85.03.
31. § 521.060, RSMo (1959); Mo. R. Civ. P. 85.05.
32. Section 521.010(l)-(4), RSMo (1959); Mo. R Civ. P. 85.01(1)-(4) provides for attachment:
(1) Where the defendant is not a resident of this state; (2) Where the
efendant is a corporation, whose chief office or place of business is
out of this state; (3) Where the defendant conceals himself, so that the
ordinary process of law cannot be served upon him; (4) Where the defendant has absconded or absented himself from his usual place of abode
in this state, so that the ordinary process of law cannot be served upon
him.
33. Section 521.010(5), (7)-(11), (14), RSMo (1959); Mo. R. Civ. P. 85.01 (5),
(7)-(I1), (14), provide for attachment:
(5) Where the defendant is about to remove his property or effects out
of this state, with the intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors
...(7) Where the defendant has fraudulently conveyed or assigned his
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/8
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juriscellaneous grounds which are neither for the purpose of obtaining
34
diction nor imply wrong doing on the part of the defendant.
It should be noted that the Missouri statute does not provide for notice
to the defendant in every case,3 5 nor for the right to a hearing before
issuance of the writ of garnishment. However, since it appears that
Sniadach does not require notice or hearing when the garnishment statute
is narrowly drawn to obtain jurisdiction or in the case of extraordinary
circumstances, it follows that the major portion of the Missouri garnishment statute allowing prejudgment garnishment of wages is constitutional.
The portion of the statute that does raise constitutional problems seems
to be that mentioned in (3) above, which arguably does not contemplate
an "extraordinary situation." Accordingly, prejudgment garnishment under
these provisions of the statute would probably violate the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment, unless the Missouri legislature
were to amend the statute to provide for notice to the defendant in these
situations and a right to be heard before issuance of a writ of garnishment.
The Court's action in the noted case may well be attributed to the
fairly recent concern over the rights of the debtor.3 6 Though the Supreme
Court has prohibited the use of prejudgment garnishment of wages solely
as an "arm-twisting" collection device, the decision will not abolish the
use of this provisional remedy. This step, if it is to be taken, has been
left to the state legislatures.3 7 For the present, however, prejudgment
property or effects, so as to hinder or delay his creditors; (8) Where the
defendant has fraudulently concealed, removed or disposed of his property
or effects, so as to hinder or delay his creditors; (9) Where the defendant
is about fraudulently to convey or assign his property or effects, so as to
hinder or delay his creditors; (10) Where the defendant is about fraudulently to conceal, remove, or dispose of his property or effects, so as to
hinder or delay his creditors; (11) Where the cause of action accrued
out of this state, and the defendant has absconded, or secretly removed
his property or effects into this state . .. (14) Where the debt sued for

was fraudulently contracted on the part of the debtor.
34. Section 521.010(6), (12), (13), RSMo (1959); Mo. R. Civ. P. 85.01(6),
(12), (13), provide for attachment:
(6) Where the defendant is about to remove out of this state, with the
intent to change his domicile ... (12) Where the damages for which the

action is brought are for injuries arising from the commission of some
felony or misdemeanor, or for the seduction of any female; (13) Where
the debtor has failed to pay the price or value of any article or thing
delivered, which by contract, he was bound to pay upon delivery.
35. Section 525.290, RSMo (1959); Mo. P. Civ. P. 90.28, do provide that
before wages are garnished in aid of attachment, personal service must be had
upon the defendant, unless
the suit be brought in the county where the defendant resides, or in
the county where the debt is contracted and the cause of action arose or
accrued, and in cities over one hundred thousand inhabitants in the city
where the defendant resides or the debt is contracted and the cause of
action accrued....
36. See, e.g., Satter, An Argument for Abolition of Wage Attachment, 52
ILL. BAR J. 1026 (1964); Lauer, Modification of Wage Garnishment, 24 J. Mo.
BAR 242 (1968); Comment, 43 WAsH. L. R.v. 743 (1968); and Comment, 1967
Wis. L. REv.759.
37. In this respect it should be noted that the Final Draft of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, § 5.104, (C.C.H. extra ed., No. 183, Aug. 19, 1968)
proposes the abolition of all garnishment of wages before judgment.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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garnishment of wages may still be used as a means to obtain jurisdiction
over the defendant or his property and to prevent the debtor from intentionally hindering or delaying his creditors. In effect, the Court has
abolished many of the injustices resulting from prejudgment garnishment
of wages and restricted the use of this provisional remedy to those instances
where it has a definite purpose aside from being a mere harrassment device for creditors.
Whether the holding in Snaidach will remain limited to garnishment
of wages remains to be seen. The Court did distinguish wages from
other forms of property by considering the repercussions on a family when
a portion of the anticipated income of a debtor suddenly and unexpectedly
does not materialize.3 8 However, it seems just as logical to assume that
these same repercussions would result if a debtor is suddenly and unexpectedly deprived of property other than wages where such property
provides the means of earning his livelihood. For example, the attachment
of a personally owned automobile used in the debtor's occupation as a
salesman, the attachment of the stock inventory upon sales of which a
debtor-retailer depends to earn a living, and the attachment of the tools
an automobile mechanic uses in his profession3 9 could easily result in
the loss of expected income. As in the case of the loss of a portion of
earned wages, such a loss would "impose tremendous hardship on wage
earners with families to support" 40 and possibly drive a family "below the
poverty level." 41 Therefore, it seems that the decision reached in Sniadach
logically should be extended to that property upon which a wage earner
directly relies to provide his income.
WILLIAM A. ATKirNsON

38. 395 U.S. at 340.
39. Mechanic's tools of trade are usually protected from attachment by state
exemption laws. See e.g., § 513.435(7), RSMo (1959); CAL. CIV. PRO. § 690.4, (West

Supp. 1970); IOWA
(Supp. 1969).

CoDE ANN.

§ 627.6 (17)

(1950);

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 60-2305 (2)

40. 395 U.S. at 340.
41. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/8
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TAXATION-ADJUSTMENT FOR DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
REQUIRED IN COMPUTING SECTION 1341 DEDUCTION
United States v. Skelly Oil Co.'
On August 1, 1952, the Corporation Commission of the State of
Oklahoma promulgated a minimum price order which required gas
producers, including the plaintiff, Skelly Oil Co., to increase the price
charged to their customers. The Commission forced the plaintiff to increase
the charge to certain customers despite the existence of gas purchase
contracts with them, signed before the effective date of the order, which
called for a lower price. Plaintiff collected this higher price until the
minimum price order was vacated by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
1958.2 The customers covered by the contracts demanded repayment of
the difference between the original contract price and the price charged
during the time that the minimum price order was in effect. This amounted
to $505,536.54, which Skelly repaid in 1958.
In its federal income tax return for 1958, Skelly deducted as a
business expense, or loss, from its gross income the amount repaid to the
overcharged customers. Upon audit by the government, Skelly's otherwise
allowable deduction was reduced by $139,022.55, representing 27 % of
the $505,536.54 which plaintiff had deducted in earlier years as percentage
depletion. 3 Skelly paid the additional tax, which resulted from the recomputation, and filed a timely claim for refund, which was disallowed. Plaintiff
then brought an action in the federal district court to recover the additional
tax paid. That court held in favor of the government. 4 The court of
appeals reversed, 5 but the Supreme Court directed a reinstatement of the
judgment of the district court. A majority of the Court found that subsection 1341 (a) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which the
parties had stipulated governed the case, required a recomputation of the
depletion allowance. Section 1341 states in part:
(a) General Rule. -If(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable
year (or years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an
unrestricted right to such item;
(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because
it was established after the close of such prior taxable year (or
years) that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to
such item or to a portion of such item; and
(3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $3,000, then the

1. 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
2. This was the result of the decision in Michigan Pipeline Co. v. Corp.
Comm'n of Oklahoma, 355 U.S. 425 (1958).
3. Oil and gas producers are allowed to deduct 27V% of gross income from
property. The deduction is meant to compensate the owner for exhaustion of
assets. INT. R.EV. CoIE of 1954, § 613.

4. Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Okla. 1966).
5. Skelly Oil Co. v. United States, 392 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1967), af 'd on
rehearing, 392 F.2d 133 (1968).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser
of the following:
(4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or
(5) an amount equal to(A) the tax or the taxable year computed without such
deduction, minus
(B) the decrease in the tax under this chapter (or the
corresponding provisions of prior revenue laws) for the prior
taxable year (or years) which would result solely from the
exclusion of such item (or portion thereof) from gross income
for such prior taxable year (or years). 6
The Court concluded that since the word "deduction" in sub-section
1341 (a) (4), need not necessarily be equivalent to the word "item" referred
to in sub-section 1341(a)(1), the government had properly adjusted respondent's 1958 deduction to take into account previous years' depletion
allowances. Further, the Court explained that looking to the depletion
allowances of prior years does no violence to the annual accounting concept as Skelly had contended. Finally, in agreeing with the government,
the Court held that Congress did not intend to allow taxpayers the
practical equivalent of a double deduction, for this would yield inequitable
results, i.e., in effect the taxpayer would be allowed to deduct the percentage in the year that the income was originally reported and again in
the year of repayment.
The origin of the issues involved in Skelly was a series of cases involving the so-called "claim of right" doctrine 7 which required a taxpayer to
report as income in the year received all receipts held under an unrestricted
claim of right. The taxpayer was allowed, however, to deduct in a subsequent tax year any part of this amount which was lost because it had
been determined in the subsequent year of loss or repayment that it was
wrongfully held.8 No recomputation of the earlier year's taxes was permitted, for it was held that this would violate the concept of annual
accounting, adopted in Burnet v. Sanford & 'Brooks,9 which required
computation of taxable income on the basis! of income and expenses

6, INr. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1341.

7. For an in depth discussion of the history of the claim of right doctrine
and § 1341 see Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine: 1954 Version, 10 TAX
L. REv. 381 (1955). The origin of "claim of right" was North American Oil
Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932).
8. Items held with an unrestricted claim of right are those items that
appear from all the facts available in the year of inclusion to be gross income
of the taxpayer with no limitation upon their use. Items wrongfully held are
those items previously held with an unrestricted claim of right that are subsequently required to be restored to another because it is established after the
close of the prior tax year that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right
to the item. For example, a mistake in computation of an employee's commission
resulting in an overpayment that is not discovered until after the close of the tax
year in which it was paid would be an item wrongfully held. See Treas. Reg. §
1.1341-1(a)(2) (1970).
9. 282 U.S. 59 (1931). The Court adopted the annual approach apparently because of its comparative ease of application and production of governmental revenue at regular intervals.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/8
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resulting from all of the taxpayer's transactions during a single year. The
income tax had to be definitely and finally ascertainable at the end of
each year and this would not be the case if subsequent recomputations of
the prior year's taxes were allowed.
This doctrine led to harsh results in some cases, causing some courts
to adopt various theories to circumvent it. For example, assume that an
employee received a bonus, paid taxes on it, and was required to refund
it in a later year. His tax saving in the subsequent year could be less than
the additional taxes he paid as a result of the inclusion of the bonus in
the year of receipt, if his taxable income fell in a tax bracket lower in
the year of restoration than in the year of receipt. Strict adherence to the
claim of right doctrine would require a deduction in the year of repayment, but some courts allowed a refund of the original taxes paid on
the theory that there was a mistake of fact. 10 Another theory accepted
by some courts was that there was an "impressed trust"; a taxpayer was
said to have held the item not under claim of right, but impressed with
a trust in favor of the creditors of his transferor." These theories can
be regarded as holdovers from the long standing feud between those who
favored strict adherence to the annual accounting concept, and proponents
of the so-called transactional approach to accounting. The transactional
approach would treat each transaction separately; the income from each
transaction would be determined only upon completion of the entire
transaction.
Many courts refused to accept these theories and a conflict between
the circuits developed, which the Supreme Court attempted to settle in
Healy v. Commissioner.12 In that case the Supreme Court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that because he held the funds as a constructive
trustee, he should be allowed for tax purposes to have the loss reflected
in the year of receipt rather than the year of repayment. Thus the Court
reaffirmed the position it had taken in United States v. Lewis,18 where
the taxpayer failed to convince the Court that repayment of earnings
received under a mistake of fact permitted a recomputation of the earlier
year's taxes. Consequently, after Healy a taxpayer was not allowed to
recompute a prior year's taxes and make an adjustment when he was
forced to refund items held under claim of right. He was required to take
a deduction in the year of repayment.
However, other cases had required the taxpayer to look to a prior
year's returns to determine the nature (i.e., ordinary income, capital gain,
10. Greenwald v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 569 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
11. Hall C. Smith v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 174 (1948), affd, 194 F.2d 536 (6th Cir.
1952).
12. 345 U.S. 278 (1953).
18. 340 U.S. 590 (1951). This case is a prime example of the harsh result
obtained from requiring stnct adherence to the claim of right doctrine and the
annual accounting concept. Such adherence allows no recomputation or reference
to the prior year, but instead requires a deduction in the year of repayment.
Reference to this inequity and particularly to the Lewis case was made in both
the House committee report (H.R. REP. No. 1887, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 294 (1954))
and the Senate committee report (S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 452
(1954)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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etc.) of a present year's deduction. In Arrowsmith v. Commissioner1 4 the
taxpayers, corporate shareholders, reported as capital gain certain income
realized on liquidation of their corporation. In a subsequent year when
they were forced to pay a judgment obtained against the corporation they
claimed an ordinary loss; but the Court ruled that income taxed as
capital gain when received must be reported as capital loss when subsequently restored.
This was the state of the law when Congress revised the Internal
Revenue Code in 1954. Congress provided a remedy for taxpayers in
the position of Healy or Lewis through the enactment of section 1341,
which incorporated the annual accounting approach into sub-section 1341
(a)(4) and the transactional approach into sub-section 1341(a)(5). Legislative history indicates that Congress intended no new deduction under
section 1341, but only an alternative to a deduction allowable under some
other section of the Code.1 5 The report of the Senate Committee on
Finance states:
Under present law if a taxpayer is obliged to repay amounts
which he had received in a prior year and included in income
because it appeared that he had an unrestricted right to such
amounts, he may take a deduction in the year of restitution. In
many instances of this nature, the deduction allowable in later
years does not compensate the taxpayer adequately for the tax
paid in the earlier year.
If the taxpayer included an item in gross income in one
taxable year, and in a subsequent taxable year he becomes intitled
to a deduction because the item or portion thereof is no longer
subject to his unrestricted use, and the amount of the deduction
is in excess of $3,000, the tax for the subsequent year is reduced
by either the tax attributable to the deduction or the decrease
in the tax for the prior year attributable to the removal of the
item, whichever is greater. Under the rule of the Lewis case
(340 U.S. 590 (1951)), the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction only
in the year of repayment.'8
However, in regard to the precise issue in Skelly, whether the taxpayer was
allowed to deduct the full amount of the refund without reducing it by
the amount previously claimed as a depletion allowance, the legislative
history is ambiguous.
The House report on section 1341 states:
In computing the tax reduction for the prior taxable year
attributable to the removal of the item in question, if the earlier
year would otherwise be closed, no other items may be adjusted.
However, to the extent that adjusted gross income or taxable income may be changed, items such as medical and charitable
deductions which are dependent upon income may also be
affected.17

14. 344 U.S. 6 (1952).

15. See also, National Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 244 F.
Supp. 135 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
16. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118, 451 (1954).
17. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 86, 294 (1954) (emphasis added).
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Depletion allowances are not specifically mentioned. Thus, the argument
can be made that depletion allowances are not included in items dependent upon income referred to in the report, since the depletion
allowance is computed from gross income from property and not from
adjusted gross income or taxable income, both of which are mentioned
in the report.' 8 Furthermore, the adjustment to which the report refers
may apply only if the transactional approach of 1341 (a) (5) is followed,
since the paragraph begins: "In computing the tax reduction for the prior
taxable year.. . ."19 It is not necessary to compute the tax reduction for
the prior taxable year if the annual accounting approach of 1341 (a) (4) is
utilized. In any event, the original intent of Congress is not clear and the
cases involving the statute are useless so far as the problem in Skelly is
concerned; they mainly involve controversies over whether section 1341
applies at all. 20 In Skelly the parties not only stipulated that it applied
but also which specific part of it controlled. Thus, in view of the scant
judicial authority on the subject and an ambiguous legislative history,
the Court could have decided Skelly in favor of either party.
The precise issue in Skelly was whether the word "item" in sub-section
1341(a)(1) was to be read as being interchangeable with the word "deduction" in sub-section 1341(a)(4). If so, no adjustment for depletion allowance could be permitted because the amount of the "deduction" then would
not be equivalent to the amount of the "item".
In support of the adjustment the government argued, first, that the
"deduction" was to be determined by principles that generally govern
the allowance of deductions and was not defined by section 1341; second,
that section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code, 21 which allows a deduction
for any loss sustained during the taxable year, required Skelly's loss deduction to be limited to 72%7, of the amount refunded; third, that the rule
forbidding double deductions requires the adjustment to be made; and
fourth, that if the deduction for the full amount is allowed, Skelly be
required to include in its income an amount equal to the depletion previously allowed with respect to the amounts refunded.22
Skelly, on the other hand, contended that a deduction of the full
amount, without an adjustment for the depletion allowance in the year
of refund, was consistent with the claim of right doctrine that applied
before the enactment of section 1341, and also with section 1341, since
"item" and "deduction" had been used interchangeably. Skelly also argued that section 165 was not applicable since the deduction in this case
involved a business expense under section 162.23 The acceptance of the
government's position would result in the creation of an inverse tax
18. See Casey, Restorations Under Section 1341 of the 1954 Internal Rev-

enue Code, 16 TUL. TAx INsT. 644, 673-78 (1967).

19. See note 17 supra.
20. See, e.g., Maxwell v. United States, 334 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1964); Portland Copper and Tank Works, Inc. v. Comm'r., 351 F.2d 460 (1st Cir. 1965).
21. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 165.
22. These four contentions were summarized from appellant's brief.
23. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162. This section allows a deduction for all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on a trade or business.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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benefit rule 24 or a tax equalization rule,2 5 contended Skelly, and this
would require the
overruling of a long line of precedents that reached the
20
opposite result.

The Court held that the language of section 1341 did not require
that the respondent be allowed a deduction for the full amount. The
Court reasoned that since section 1341 was found in sub-chapter Q, which
deals largely with side effects of the annual' accounting system, other
portions of the Code must be referred to in order to determine how much
of a deduction is allowable; and that the deductible amount should not be
determined by a mechanical equation of the word "item" with the word
"deduction." Regardless of whether the refunds were deductible as business losses under section 165 of the Code or as a business expense under
section 162, the Court found the result to be the "practical equivalent of
a double deduction" which should not be permitted absent a clear declaration of intent by Congress. 27 The Court rejected Skelly's argument that the
adjustment violates the annual accounting concept.
The effect of this decision on future cases involving section 1341 and
the "claim of right" doctrine is not altogether clear. While this decision
solves the previously unanswered problem involving the depletion allowance, it raises questions in other areas. For example, Justice Stewart,
dissenting, argued that the Court's ruling would require the "1341 deduction" taken in a current taxable year to be reduced by the percentage of
gross income in the prior year of receipt that was not included in taxable
income in that prior year, whatever the reason. He cites as examples deductions for charitable contributions, medical expenses, and the standard
10 percent deduction. It is doubtful that the majority intended such a
result. The charitable contribution and medical expense deductions are
not analogous to the depletion allowance since the amount that is deducted as a charitable contribution or medical expense represents an
actual expense (the money being no longer in the hands of the taxpayer)
while the depletion represents no real expense and the taxpayer retains
the use of the money.

24. The tax benefit rule excludes from income recoveries from which the
taxpayer derived no tax benefit in the prior year of deduction. Conversely,
recoveries are taxable to the extent that the taxpayer received a prior benefit.
While the latter is an accounting principle to which the tax benefit rule takes
exception, the courts have referred to both situations as involving the "tax benefit rule." P-H 1970 FED. TAXEs 8526. See also Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule
Today, 57 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1943).
25. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967),
held that these recoveries are taxable at the rate applicable in the year of recovery rather than in the year that the tax benefit was gained. Application of
this so-called "tax equalization" doctrine would require an opposite result.
26. These arguments were summarized from appellee's brief.
27. The Court relied on Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934). In
this case the parent corporation filed consolidated tax returns with its subsidiaries,
whose losses exceeded their profits. The Court rejected the parent's claim to a
loss deduction upon liquidation of the subsidiaries because the consolidated
returns had already reflected these losses on the part of the parent corporation.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/8
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The standard deduction, 28 however, presents a definite problem. If
the majority's reasoning is strictly followed, readjustment of the deduction
will be required to prevent the "practical equivalent of a double deduction." Assume, for example, that a married taxpayer filing a joint return
has adjusted gross income of $10,000 in a prior tax year and takes the
standard deduction. In the current year, assume further that the taxpayer
is forced to refund $4,000 under section 1341(a)(4). He has been in effect
allowed a "double deduction" of $400, representing the percentage of the
$4,000 that was excluded from taxable income in both the prior year and
the current year. In the vast majority of cases, this "double deduction" is
comparatively small; but it is just in such a case that the difficulties involved in applying the result in Skelly should be avoided.
The argument can also be advanced that the principle adopted in
Skelly applies to "claim of right" cases that do not fall under section 1341.
The significance of this contention is that, if accepted, there would be no
$3,000 limitation, as there is under section 1341, and many tax returns
could be affected. If this application of the principle were accepted, it
would raise the possibility that a taxpayer might invoke the claim of
right principle to his benefit (rather than detriment) insofar as medical
expense deductions under section 213 are concerned. 29 The taxpayer is
presently allowed to deduct those medical expenses which are in excess
of 3%/ of his adjusted gross income under this section. If a taxpayer had
medical expenses of $1,000 in a prior year and an adjusted gross income
of $20,000, he would be allowed to deduct $400. If in the current year
the taxpayer is forced to refund $4,000 of the income held in the prior
year under claim of right, he has lost a tax benefit of $120 (he would
have been permitted to deduct $520 rather than $400 had the adjustment
been made) which is arguably deductible in the current year.
The taxpayer in Skelly was not afforded a tax windfall, so the result
would seem to be equitable. However, a wiser solution may have been
to allow the taxpayer to reap the benefits of the tax windfall, while leaving to Congress the correction of inequities existent in the tax law. 0 As
illustrated by the examples above, the result reached in Skelly may prove
troublesome in future cases.

Gnmni=

N. DRENAN

28. The standard deduction is 10% of adjusted gross income with a
maximum deduction of $1,000. It applies only to individual taxpayers and not
to corporations.
29. Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for that
portion of medical expenses that exceeds 3% of adjusted gross income. The deduction is restricted to a taxpayer who itemizes his personal and non-business
deductions.
30. This was Justice Douglas' position dissenting in Skelly, 394 U.S. at
687-92 (1969).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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CHARITABLE IMMUNITY: A FINAL ANSWER?
Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's'
Plaintiff Abernathy was a patient at defendant hospital, a charitable
institution. He was assisted from his bed to his bathroom where he was left
unattended and, because of his weakened condition, fell and broke his
right leg. He alleged negligence on the part of the hospital for both its
failure to provide an attendant to aid him and its failure to provide hand
rails for his support. 2 Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds of charitable immunity was sustained and plaintiff appealed.
Plaintiff recognized that the doctrine which excused charitable institutions
from tort liability had been the rule in Missouri since 1907,8 but asked
the court to review and reverse that doctrine.4
In a very thorough examination of the "charitable immunity" doctrine the court discussed the rationale on which the doctrine in Missouri
was based, and in the light of modern cirmumstances, found that neither the
"implied waiver" theory nor the "trust fund" theory could stand the test
of logic. The "implied waiver" theory, that one who accepts the benefit
of a charity implicitly agrees not to assert an action against the institution,
was found to be a mere fiction since it was applied equally to the insane,
the unconscious, and the infant.5 The "trust fund" theory, which rested
on the notion that contributions to charitable institutions were for charitable purposes and were not to be used to pay judgments, was regarded as
dealing only with the right to recovery and not the right to maintain a
cause of action. 0 Having found no sound basis for the charitable immunity
doctrine, the court abolished it, overruling Adams v. University Hospital,7
but made the overruling prospective only. The decision was declared to
have effect only in this case and its companion, Gamier v. St. Andrew
Presbyterian Church of St. Louis s and in cases where the cause of action
arose after the date of this decision, November 10, 1969. 9
Much has been written regarding the rise and fall of the charitable
immunity doctrine, and little purpose can be served by further discussion
here.' 0 It appears from these cases that the main reason for abandoning the

1. 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
2. Id.
8. Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1907).
4. 446 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
5. Id. at 604.
6. Id.
7. 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453 (K.C. Ct. App. 1907).
8. 446 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. En Banc 1969). This case removed the immunity
which had been previously enjoyed by churches.
9. 446 S.W.2d 599, 606 (Mo. En Banc 1969); Gamier v. St. Andrew Presbyterian Church, 446 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
10. See Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d
485 (1967); Shulte v. Missionaries of La Salette Corp., 352 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1961);
Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 861 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Dille v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 855 Mo. 486, 196 S.W.2d 615 (1946); President & Directors of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/8
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doctrine of charitable immunity is that there is no longer any need (if there
ever was) to immunize charitable institutions for careless conduct of their
employees. At the time the doctrine was first established charities were supported mainly by small contributors and operated on relatively small scales.
Circumstances are different today. The Missouri court quotes from the
Michigan case which overruled charitable immunity in that jurisdiction;
Today charity is big business. It often is corporate both in the
identity of the donor and in the identity of the donee who administers the charity. Tax deductions sometimes make it actually profitable for donors to give to charity. Organized corporate charity takes
over large areas of social activity which otherwise would have to be
handled by government, or even by private business. Charity today
is a large-scale operation with salaries, costs and other expenses
similar to business generally. It makes sense to say that this kind
of charity should pay its own way .... 11
Judge Donnelly filed a concurring opinion in Abernathy12 and a dissent in Gamier.13 In both of these opinions he indicated that the doctrine
should not be overruled but that each case should be decided on its facts
to find if the institution is a true charity. Judge Donnelly would reaffirm
the decision in Blatt v. Geo. H. Nettleton Home for Aged Women. 14 In
that case plaintiff was injured in a building owned by a charity but not
used by the charity for charitable purposes. The court held that the doctrine did not apply.'r
In determining that the decision was to have only prospective application, the court reasoned that retrospective application of the decision would
work a great hardship on the institutions which had justifiably relied on
decisions upholding the doctrine in the past.'0 There is no doubt as to the
court's authority to make such a pronouncement,' 7 but justifiable reliance
on these decisions by charitable institutions seems to be questionable.
Georgetown College v. Hughs, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Adams v. University
Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453 (K.C. Ct. App. 1907). See also Annot.,
25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952), and Davis, The Charitable Immunity Doctrine, 25 J. Mo.
BAR 350 (1969). It is worthy of note that the doctrine now has support in only
three jurisdictions, Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-1-22 (1956); South
Carolina, Decker v. Bishop of Charleston, 147 S.E.2d 264 (S.C. 1966); and Massachusetts, Harrigan v. Cape Cod Hospital, 208 N.E.2d 232 (Mass. 1965). Even in
these jurisdictions there are a variety of situations in which the doctrine does not
apply. See Davis, The Charitable Immunity Doctrine, 25 J. Mo. BAR. 350, 353
(1969).
11. Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich. 1, 24, 105 N.W.2d 1, 12-13.
(1960).
12. 446 S.W.2d 599, 606 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
13. 446 S.W.2d 607, 608 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
14. 365 Mo. 30, 275 S.W.2d 344 (En Banc 1955).
15. Id.

16. 446 S.W.2d 599, 606 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
17. In Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), the United
States Supreme Court upheld the legality of such a ruling, but did not investigate
the wisdom of the philosophy behind it. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in discussing state
court prospective overruling, said, at page 365,
[W]e think the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject.
A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice
for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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As recent as 1961, the Missouri Supreme Court had upheld the doctrine of charitable immunity.18 However, institutions receiving the benefit
of the doctrine were given effective notice that the doctrine would be seriously questioned in the future by the concurring opinion in Koprivica v.
Bethesda General Hospital.19 In Koprivica the court had refused to decide
the charitable immunity question because the case had come to the court on
appeal from a motion granting summary judgment in which additional
facts were alleged that were not available to the trial court. But Judge
Finch's concurring opinion sounded a warning which no charitable institution could in good faith ignore. 20 He said the court should,
[I]f and when the question is fully presented to us on appeal,
carefully review the existing charitable immunity doctrine as applied to pro forma and not for profit hospitals.... I do not...
believe that we should take the position that we should leave this
determination to the legislature.2 1
The court might justifiably have made the ruling retrospective, and in
so doing would not have caused great hardship to charitable institutions.
It seems that there could be no justifiable reliance after the warning sounded
in Koprivica.22 Furthermore, the statute of limitations, 23 which places a
five year limit on personal injury actions, would bar any action arising
prior to 1965. Thus there would be a period of slightly more than one
year in which the defense of justifiable reliance would be available to
charitable institutions. In other words, there could have been justifiable
reliance on the doctrine only from November 10, 196524 to December 12,
1966.25
A situation similar to the Koprivica warning and the Abernathy over26
ruling developed in Texas. In Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church
the majority of the court upheld the charitable immunity doctrine, but a
concurring opinion stated:
I believe that the court should declare that particularly after
this decision becomes final it would feel free to reexamine the
doctrine.2 7
Three years later an intermediate appellate court overruled the doctrine
opinions in Watkins and did not
based on the dissenting and concurring
28
even consider prospective application.
backward.... We do not review the wisdom of their philosophies, but
the legality of their acts.
18. Shulte v. Missionaries of La Salette Corp. 352 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1961).
19. 410 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1966).
20. Id. at 87.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. § 516.120 (4), RSMo 1969.
24. Five years prior to Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo.
En Banc 1969).
25. Koprivica v. Bethesda General Hospital, 410 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1966).
26. 339 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1966).
27. Id. at 536.
28. Villarreal v. Santa Rosa Medical Center 443 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/8
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The Missouri cases dealing with prospective overruling indicate that
a distinction should be drawn between procedural and substantive law.29
In Koebel v. Tieman Coal & Material Co.30 the court, referring to prospective overruling, stated:
Such ruling, however, is confined to matters of procedure, and
has no application to the courts determination and announcement of some general principle of substantive law. 8 '
32
This view was reiterated in Barker v. St. Louis County, where the court
stated:
Our rule is that if the overruled decision is one dealing with
a rule of procedure, that is procedural or adjective law, then the
effect of the subsequent overruling decision is prospective only;
law,
but if the overruled decision is one dealing with substantive
33

then the effect of the subsequent overruling is retroactive.

The most recent Missouri case that considered the use of prospective overruling, Shepherd v. Consumers Cooperative Association,3 4 refused to use
it because the new ruling that a wife could maintain an action for loss
of consortium, even though she had no such right at common law, was3 a5
matter of substantive law "which creates, defines and regulates rights."
The ruling was applied retrospectively even though defendant alleged he
had relied on the wife not having an independent cause of action when
the claim was settled with her husband before trial.
The Missouri court could have followed the course which the Nebraska
court adopted in Myers v. Drozda.3 6 In that case it was stipulated that defendant hospital was a charitable institution with liability coverage of
$10,000 per injury and $30,000 aggregate. The court found that the decision should be partially retrospective to the extent that the defendant
had insurance. The court said:
A differentiating factor between a charity and its insurer is
on the exempreliance. An insured charity does not
87 rely justifiably
tion within the limits of liability.

29. Shepherd v. Consumers Cooperative Assn., 384 S.W.2d 685, 640 (Mo. En
Banc 1964); Bell v. Pedigo, 364 S.W.2d 613, 620 (Mo. 1963); Zachary v. Kroger,
Inc., 332 S.W. 2d 471, 474 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960); Moore v. Ready Mix Concrete
Co., 329 S.W.2d 14, 24 (Mo. En Banc 1959); Barker v. St. Louis County, 340 Mo.
986, 1001, 104 S.W.2d 871, 878-79 (1937); Koebel v. Tieman Coal & Material Co.,
337 Mo. 561, 570-71, 85 S.W.2d 519, 524 (1935).
30. 337 Mo. 561, 85 S.W.2d 519 (1985).
31. Id. at 571, 85 S.W.2d at 524.
32. 340 Mo. 986, 104 S.W.2d 371 (1937).
33. Id. at 1001, 104 S.W.2d at 877; accord, Bell v. Pedigo, 364 S.W.2d 613
(Mo. 1963); Zachary v. Kroger, Inc., 332 S.W.2d 471 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960); Moore
v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 329 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. En Banc 1959). These are the
three most recent Missouri civil cases that applied prospective overruling, and they
all relate to erroneous jury instructions rather than to substantive law.
34. 884 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
35. 36 C.J., Law § 27 (1924).
36. 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966).
37. Id. at 187-8, 141 N.W.2d at 855.
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Therefore the decision applies equally to all causes of action arising after
the filing of the opinion. As to earlier causes of action, it applies only if
the non-profit charitable hospital was insured and then only to the extent
of the maximum amount of insurance coverage. 38
This course is still available to the Missouri court under the reasoning of a federal circuit court in North Carolina interpreting North Car40
olina law.3 9 North Carolina, in Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital Inc.,
a decision very similar to the Abernathy case, overruled charitable immunity with respect to hospitals. The court stated that the overruling would
have effect only as to those causes of action arising after the filing of the
opinion.4 1 Two years later the Fourth Circuit decided in Hill v. James
Walker Memorial Hospital 42 that under Carolina law a cause of action
arising on June 6, 1964 would not be barred by the prospective effect
of Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital Inc.4 3 In reaching this decision
the federal court noted that there was no insurance involved in Rabon
and that the court in Rabon refused full retroactive application of the new
rule after expressing concern over the danger to trust funds of inadequately
insured hospitals.4 4 The court in Hill also observed that the State court, in
announcing the prospective effect of Rabon, had said that they would
follow the procedure adopted in Nebraska which allows recovery if defendant is protected by insurance. 49 The court, in deciding this case as they
thought the North Carolina Supreme Court would have, refused to allow
an absurd result by barring recovery. The court reasoned that such a bar
would actually give shelter to the insurer, rather than to the charitable institution as was intended by Rabon.40 In a later decision, Helms v. Williams,47 the North Carolina Court of Appeals repudiated the position taken
by the federal circuit court in Hill v. James Walker Memorial Hospital.4 8
The court of appeals cited Rabon and a recently enacted North Carolina
statute, 49 which abrogated charitable immunity as of September 1, 1967,
as authority for the proposition that a cause of action arising in 1964 was
barred. 0 The court however, did find reversible error in that there was
ample evidence in the record that the hospital's negligence was in hiring
the agent and that North Carolina's charitable immunity doctrine was
only applicable when the charitable institution was to be held under the
theory of respondeat superior.51
Since the primary purpose of prospective overruling is to prevent injury
to those who justifiably relied on precedent, and little or no such reliance
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Hill v. James Walker Memorial Hospital, 407 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1969).
269 N.G. 450, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
Id.
407 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1969).
269 N.C. 450, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
407 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1969).
Id.
Id.
4 N.C. App. 391, 166 S.E.2d 852 (1969).
407 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1969).
N.C. GmrN. STAT. § 1-539.9 (1967).
Helms v. Williams, 4 N.C. App. 391, 166 S.E.2d 852 (1969).
Id.
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can be found in Missouri due to the Koprivica warning, 52 there seems to be
no reason for the prospective application of Abernathy. In addition, the inclination in Missouri has been to distinguish between procedural and substantive matters when dealing with prospective overruling, giving prospective application only to those cases dealing with procedural matters. 53 Thus
it seems that the court took an unnecessary step to protect the charitable institutions and in so doing may deny many plaintiffs their causes of action.
Abernathy does, however, leave open the question of liability when insurance is present. The Abernathy case contained no allegations of insurance
coverage and it would seem possible that Missouri courts still could adopt
the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Hill. This is especially true since Missouri has no statute comparable to the North Carolina statute 54 for the
court to hang its hat on in order to stick to its prospective overruling in
Abernathy.
In conclusion, Missouri attorneys should be warned that Abernathy
may not be the final answer to the charitable immunity question in Missouri. The court did overrule the charitable immunity doctrine in Abernathy
but allowed the ruling to have only prospective effect. The court might be
persuaded that Koprivica did not supply adequate warning to charitable
institutions, or the court may adopt the insurance exception to prospective
overruling expressed in the North Carolina federal court.
GERA.D

D.

MCBETH

CORPORATION STOCK REPURCHASESURPLUS TEST APPLICATION DATE
Hawkins v. Mall, Inc.1
Robert Hawkins and his wife owned a 30-room motel on Lot 4 of
Davis Place in Springfield, Missouri. Archie Eoff and his wife owned
Lots 1 and 2 of Davis Place on which they operated a restaurant and
cocktail lounge. In July, 1962, Hawkins and Eoff agreed to combine their
interests by joining in a corporation, The Mall, Inc., for the purpose of
2
building a new motel, restaurant and cocktail lounge on their properties.
An extremely complicated factual situation resulted which has been simplified here. Lots I and 2 held by Eoff and the west one-half of Lot 4 held
by Hawkins were conveyed to The Mall, Inc., by the owners in consideration of which Eoff was to receive 51% of the stock and Hawkins was to
receive 49%. Construction on the project soon began but differences arose
over the management of the business in March, 1963. 3 Hawkins wanted to
52. 418 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Mo. 1966).

53. Cases cited note 29, supra.
54. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 1-539.9 (1967).

1. 444 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1969).
2. Id. at 371.
3. Id. at 372.
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sell his interest in the corporation but Eoff was financially unable to take
over Hawkins' share. Eoff did, however, find a purchaser for Hawkins'
interest. On October 8, 1963, Anlee Investment Company contracted to
purchase Hawkins' property and shares in The Mall, Inc., for $210,000
payable $50,000 in cash, a first mortgage of $60,000, and a note from The
Mall, Inc., for $100,000 payable in 25 equal quarterly installments of
$4,000 each. 4 This latter note by The Mall, Inc., constituted a partial
stock repurchase transaction by the corporation. Subsequently, Southern
Commercial Savings Bank of St. Louis became a creditor of The Mall, Inc.
On December 15, 1963, The Mall, Inc., defaulted on the $100,000 note
to Hawkins.5 Hawkins brought suit in January, 1964, asking for judgment
on the note.0 One of the contentions of the defendants was that the transaction was an illegal reduction of the stated capital of the corporation
because it involved the purchase of its own capital stock at a time when
its net assets neither exceeded its stated capital nor would exceed stated
capital after the transaction, thereby bringing the transaction within the
prohibition of section 351.390, RSMo 1959. 7 That section provides for a
variation of what is commonly referred to as a balance sheet surplus test.
However, the statute is worded in such a manner that it could be construed to mean either that the installment date is the proper time to
apply the surplus test or that the outset or execution date is the proper
time.8
4. Id. at 372-73.
5. Id. at 377.
6. Id.
7. § 351.390, RSMo 1959 states:
A corporation shall have power to purchase, take, receive, or otherwise
acquire, hold, own, pledge, transfer, or otherwise dispose of its own
shares; provided, that it shall not purchase, either directly or indirectly,
its own shares when its net assets are less than its stated capital, or
when by so doing its net assets would be reduced below its stated
capital. Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation, a corporation may
purchase its own shares for the purpose of:
(1) Eliminating fractional shares;
(2) Collecting or compromising claims of the corporation, or
securing any indebtedness to the corporation previously incurred;
(3) Paying dissenting shareholders entitled to payment for their
shares in the event of a merger or consolidation or a sale or exchange
of assets;
(4) Effecting, subject to the other provisions of this chapter, the
retirement of its redeemable shares by redemption or by purchase at
not to exceed the redemption price.
8. This statement must be qualified if the section is read in conjunction
I
with § 351.195 (6), RSMo 1959, which provides:
No distribution of assets to shareholders in connection with a reduction
of stated capital shall be made out of stated capital unless the assets
of the corporation remaining after such reduction of stated capital
shall be sufficient to pay any debts of the corporation, the payment of
which shall not have been otherwise provided for.
There is an argument that the use of the phrase, "[n]o distribution of assets"
as used in this section must be compared with the use of the phrase "[a] corporation . . . shall not purchase" in § 351.390, RSMo 1959 (see note 7 supra). The

argument is that since the former phrase very clearly states a payment by
payment test to be used in connection with § 351.195 (6), the same phrase would
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/8
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Judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs on the $100,000 note in
circuit court. However, that court made no express findings on the defense of illegal reduction of stated capital, inferentially holding that the
plaintiffs were holders in due course against whom this defense could
not be asserted. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected this
finding of the lower court and stated that "the Hawkins' were payees
of the note and, as such, could not have been holders in due course." 9
Then in considering the issue of illegal reduction of stated capital, the
supreme court assumed for the sake of argument that in October, 1963,
at the time the note by The Mall, Inc., was given, the net assets of the
corporation "were not adequate to permit its purchasing or paying for
its own stock."' 0 Even so, the court held that the transaction was not
void because all stockholders approved the transaction, no rights of creditors existing at the time the note was executed were claimed to be involved, and that these subsequent creditors asserted no defense on the
basis of violation of section 351.390, RSMo 1959.11 Moreover, in express
dicta, the court said that subsequent creditors would have no standing
to assert a defense on the basis of the statutory surplus test anyway. Also,
by using October, 1963, as the date to apply the surplus test, the court
implied that an outset test would be used.
The court correctly reasoned that "[t]he essential policy consideration involved in the statutory regulation of corporate dealing in its own
stock is protection of the interests of creditors and other stockholders."1 2
Thus, when the stockholders and creditors are fully protected or consenting as they were in this case, the transaction should not be declared void.
The holding of the court is sound on this issue,' 3 although this situation
is very rare since creditors and stockholders would normally not consent
to a transaction such as the one here when the corporation is in such
serious financial trouble.
However, in using the date of the repurchase agreement rather than
the date of installment payment as the point in time to apply the section
351.890 surplus test, the court went against the overwhelming weight of
judicial authority' 4 although writers have advocated use of the repurhave been used in § 851.390 had the legislature intended the use of a payment
or installment test. Therefore, the word "purchase" which was in fact used in
§ 551.390 must manifest the legislature's intention that the test should be different
from that of § 351.195 (6). This test can only be a date of execution, or outset,
test. Query whether attributing such a refined intention to the legislature in
connection with these statutes is valid.
9. 444 S.W.2d at 385, citing Popovsky v. Griwach, 361 Mo. 1120, 288
S.W.2d 863 (1951).
10. 444 S.W.2d at 386.
11. Id.
12. Id.

13. See Barrett v. W. A. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 802, 808, 175 N.E.
765, 768 (1931); Davies v. Montana Auto Finance Corp., 86 Mont. 500, 508, 284
P. 267, 268 (1930); Otsego Paper Stock Co. v. Brown, 230 Mich. 260, 264, 202
N.W. 991, 993 (1925). The result here is also supported by the rationale in
Title Guaranty Trust Co. v. Sessinghaus, 325 Mo. 420, 429-81, 28 S.W.2d 1001,
1006-07 (1930).
14. See Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 284 F.2d 787,
742 (4th Cir. 1960); In re Mathews Const. Co., 120 F. Supp. 818, 821 (S.D. Cal.
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chase agreement or outset date.' 5 The issue is one that has not been discussed thus far in Missouri courts and deserves a more thorough consideration than that afforded it by the Hawkins court in its implied dicta.
The policy considerations in favor of the outset date should be developed
and weighed against the considerations in favor of the installment date
before the court decides the proper date of application of the surplus test.
In those states employing an equitable insolvency test rather than a
surplus test16 to determine whether a corporation may repurchase its own
shares of stock, it has almost uniformly been held that the installment date,
not the outset date, is the appropriate time to apply the test.' 7 Robinson
v. Wangemann18 is the landmark decision in that area holding that:
[I]t is essential to its validity that there be sufficient [excess of
assets over liabilities] to retire the stock, without prejudice to
creditors, at the time payment is made out of assets....

It is im-

material that the corporation was solvent and had sufficient [excess
of assets over liabilities] to make payment when the agreement
was entered into.' 9
The rule set forth in Robinson is logically sound for several reasons.
First, there is a natural reluctance against letting former shareholders
share in any guise with regular creditors in the assets of an insolvent enterprise. Also, it has been argued that former shareholders should be
treated as creditors in repurchase agreements because that type of transaction should be considered as a repurchase for cash followed by a loan.
However, that argument is not valid because the corporation is usually
already in serious financial difficulty and the idea that stockholders who
have just sold out for cash would lend money back is rather unrealistic.
1954); Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 255-56, 451 P.2d 769, 771 (1969);
Kleinberg v. Schwartz, 87 N.J. Super. 216, 225-24, 208 A. 2d 803, 807-08 (1965);
Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Twining, 211 Cal. App. 2d 302, 313-14, 34 Cal. Rptr.
317, 323 (1965); Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N.Y. 262, 264, 169 N.E. 378, 379 (1929);
To pken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 209-10, 163 N.E.

73, 736 (1928).
15. Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79
HARv. L. Rlv. 303 (1965).
16. Solvency is distinguished from surplus in that solvency refers to a

corporation's ability to meet its obligations and debts as they become due,
normally placing particular emphasis on current liabilities, whereas surplus
refers to the excess of assets over stated capital.
17. See In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 F. 357, 363 (2d Cir. 1914); In re
Semolina Macaroni Co., 109 F. Supp. 453, 455 (D.C.R.I. 1952); In re Bell
Tone Records, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 806, 810 (D.C.N.J. 1949); Shayne of Miami v.
Greybow, Inc., 232 S.C. 161, 165, 101 S.E.2d 486, 490-91 (1957); Hoover Steel
Ball Co. v. Schaefer Ball Bearings Co., 90 N.J. Eq. 164, 165-66, 106 A. 471, 472
(1919). But see La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 126, 369 P.2d 45,
48 (1962), which used the outset date without discussion of the issue, and Wolff
v. Heidritter Lumber Co., 112 N.J. Eq. 34, 37, 163 A. 140, 141 (1932) which
stated:

[If a repurchase of stock] would be valid if the money were then and
there paid out.. . it is not perceived why the purchase would be invalidated if the company, instead of giving its check in payment, gave its
note or its other obligation for deferred payment.
18. 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1935).
19. Id. at 757.
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Professor Herwitz in his article, Installment Repurchase of Stock:
Surplus Limitations,20 notes the above reasons for applying the solvency
test at the installment date along with two more technical reasons. First,
he reasons that:
[W]hen the selling stockholders [are] insiders, a delay between
the agreement and the payment date might really amount to a
hedge against financial disaster for the selling stockholders, since
the insiders [are] in a position to rescind the purchase
if the for2
tunes of the corporation [take] a turn for the better. '
Also, the equity insolvency test emphasizes current liabilities. Therefore,
as Herwitz points out, it is reasonable to apply the test against only so
22
much of the repurchase as is currently due.

In states where a surplus test is used instead of or along with an
insolvency test, courts have proceeded directly from the usage of the installment date for the date of application of an insolvency test to the
usage of the installment date for the surplus test with no consideration
of possible differences between the two situations. Thus, in the most noted
case, Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc., v. Commissioner,23 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals cited several insolvency cases 24 for the proposition
that "[w]hen a corporation purchases a portion of its outstanding stock
with an agreement to pay for it at a subsequent time, it may not perform
its promise if the use of its funds in performance will impair its capital.1 25
New York 26 and California 27 have also analogized the solvency test to the
surplus test in determining the date of application without consideration of
the issue.
There are, however, important differences between the insolvency
test and the surplus test that should be considered before deciding that
the date of application should be the same for both. Herwitz delves into
these differences in depth in his article.28 The first obvious difference is
20. 79 HAtv. L. R.rv. 303, 309 (1965).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960).
24. Id. at 742, citing A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Brown, 71 F.2d 745,
746 (4th Cir. 1934); Boggs v. Fleming, 66 F.2d 859, 860 (4th Cir. 1933); Davies
v. Montana Auto Finance Corp., 86 Mont. 500, 506, 284 P. 267, 269 (1930);
Fuller v. Motor & Tire Service Co., 190 N.C. 655, 656, 130 S.E. 545, 546 (1925).
Also cited were some cases that did involve the surplus test including Acker v.
Girard Trust Co., 42 F.2d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1930); In re O'Gara &eMaguire, Inc.,
259 F. 935, 938-40 (D.C.N.J. 1919).
25. Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 284 F.2d 737, 742
(4th Cir. 1960).
26. See Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N.Y. 262, 265, 169 N.E. 378, 379 (1929,
citing Richards v. Ernst Wiener Co., 207 N.Y. 59, 65, 100 N.E. 592, 592-93 (1912),
which was weak authority because it was a stock repurchase option plan.
27. See Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Twining, 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 313-14,
34 Cal. Rptr. 317, 323-24 (1963), citing In re Mathews Const. Co., 120 F. Supp.
818, 821 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Goodman v. Global Indus., 80 Cal. App. 2d 583, 587,
182 P.2d 300, 303 (1947). Only the Goodman case cited any authority in support
of its holding, and Herwitz raises serious question as to its validity.
28. Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock; Surplus Limitations, 79
HAv. L. Rv. 303 (1965).
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that the surplus test does not emphasize current liabilities whereas the
equity insolvency test does. Thus, there is no obstacle to applying the
surplus test to the total face amount of an installment obligation at the
outset. Another glaring difference is that creditors would not be endangered
nearly as much by an outset surplus test as they would be by an installment solvency test. Herwitz so reasons, stating that "[p]ayment of an
installment that impairs capital is surely a far cry from putting former
stockholders on a parity with creditors in the liquidation of an insolvent
enterprise." 2 9 Still another problem is created by an installment surplus
test when it causes the repurchase transaction to be suspended in the
middle of the repurchase plan. Then the former stockholder is left with
the rights of neither a stockholder nor a creditor. This may be particularly
damaging to a stockholder who had held a majority of shares because
majority
at the time the transaction is suspended, he may be caught without
30
holdings and without a remedy to regain his majority status.
The installment date for the surplus test also raises troublesome accounting problems. One such problem is how to account for cancellation of
the treasury stock. Should it be cancelled at outset or only by installment?
Also, the installment date test allows a corporation to dissipate its surplus
31
so as to render itself unable to make future installment payments.
Finally, under the installment approach a limited amount of surplus may
be used to repurchase an unlimited amount of stock. If there is enough
surplus to cover the first installment, that installment and every installment thereafter would be charged to stated capital in its turn, thus creating at least a technical surplus which would be used to justify the next
32
installment.
After considering these problems inherent in the installment approach
Herwitz concludes that adoption of the outset date would alleviate many
of the problems.33 However, Missouri should not accept this conclusion
without first analyzing the considerations in favor of adopting the installment date for the surplus test. It does indeed give the creditor more protection. Since protection of the creditor is one of the major reasons for
the surplus test, this alone may be a compelling justification for the use
of the installment date. Also, the application of the surplus test at the
installment date might make it possible to effect desirable repurchase
transactions which would be impossible under an outset surplus test because of lack of adequate surplus at the time of the original agreement. In
the final analysis, the decision will probably be the result of a weighing of
the advantages of an outset surplus test against the policy consideration of
protecting creditors under an installment surplus test.
29.
30.
holders
31.
32.

Id. at 314.
Proper drafting may alleviate this problem. For example, the sharemay agree beforehand to make up any deficit.
Here again, this problem may be avoided by proper drafting.
This procedure would be limited in Missouri by § 351.195, RSMo 1959.
83. Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock; Surplus Limitations, 79
HARV. L. Ruv. 303 (1965). It appears that the state of Washington may have
adopted Herwitz's conclusion. See Kummert, The Financial Provisions of the
New Washington Business CorporationAct, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 387, 389-90 (1967),
comparing WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010 (8) (1965) to § 23A.08.030 (1) (2) (1967)
and citing Herwitz with approval.
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The court in the Hawkins decision, of course, was not required to
give full consideration to these factors since the problem was decided on
other grounds. However, when the court is directly presented with the
issue of when to apply the surplus test as required in section 851.390,
RSMo 1959, both sides of the argument should be considered before a
precedential ruling is laid down.
Such a decision might also affect another statement made as dicta
by the Hawkins court. In speaking of the interests of the subsequent creditors, Southern Commercial Savings Bank of St. Louis, the court said
that as subsequent creditors they would have no standing to assert a
defense on the basis of violation of the surplus test.34 The case law cited
for that assertion was based on the general rule that:
[a] subsequent creditor of a corporation cannot complain of a
conveyance or transfer of the corporate property unless such conveyance or transfer was made with the intent to hinder, delay and
defraud subsequent creditors ... s
That rule is valid if the surplus test is applied at the outset as it was
in the Hawkins case and the transaction is not considered conditional as
it would be under the installment method. However, if the installment date
is decided upon as the critical date, then the general rule is that subsequent
creditors do have standing to have the repurchase transaction declared
invalid if they are without knowledge of the purchase.3 6 One case indicates in dictum a willingness to allow subsequent creditors even with knowledge to later complain.3 7 But a few decisions hold that no subsequent
creditor may later complain.3 8 Thus, consideration by future courts of
the problem of whether to use the outset date or the installment date in
the application of the surplus test should be accompanied by a consideration of the status of subsequent creditors.
JoHN R.

PHILLIPs

34. 444 S.W.2d at 386.
35. Coleman v. Hagey, 252 Mo. 102, 145-46, 158 S.W. 829, 843 (1913), citing
Wilson v. Stevens, 129 Ala. 630, 29 S. 678 (1901). Coleman has been cited with
approval for this proposition in Hartman v. Lauchli, 238 F.2d 881, 889 (8th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Hale v. Hummel, 64 F.2d 210, 213
(8th Cir. 1933). Accord, Graham v. Railroad Co., 102 U.S. 148 (1880); In re
Southern Laundry, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 664, 666 (S.D. Fla. 1951).
36. See Jarroll Coal Co. v. Lewis, 210 F.2d 578, 580-81 (4th Cir. 1954);
Kleinberg v. Schwartz, 87 N.J. Super. 216, 223-24, 208 A.2d 803, 808 (1965);
Lefker v. Harner, 123 Ark. 575, 583, 186 S.W. 75, 77 (1916); Clark v. E.C. Clark
Mach. Co., 151 Mich. 416, 421, 115 N.W. 416, 417-18 (1908). See also 6A W.
FLETCHER, PRIvATE CoPaoRATioNs § 2861 (penn. ed. rev. repl. 1968); Herwitz, supra
note 27, at 316-17; 20 MINN. L. REv. 425-26 (1936).
37. Loveland & Co. v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 149 Ore. 58, 77, 39 P.2d 668,
675 (1934).
38. E.g., Kaminsky v. Phinizy, 54 F.2d 16, 17 (5th Cir. 1931).
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RELATION BETWEEN AN INSURER'S PREJUDICE AND
THE NOTICE PROVISION; DETERMINATION OF VALID
AND COLLECTIBLE OTHER INSURANCE
Greer v. Zurich Insurance Company'
In December, 1962, plaintiffs sustained injuries when the car in which
they were riding collided with a 1960 Buick driven by Bobby Joe McMasters. Twenty-five months later plaintiffs obtained a $15,000 personal
injury judgment against McMasters. They then brought a three count
suit, pursuant to sections 379.195 and 379.200, RSMo,2 to reach and apply
the proceeds of four separate insurance policies to the satisfaction of this
unpaid judgment. In the first count plaintiffs sought a judgment against
defendants Zurich Insurance Company, which had insured one Commercial Credit Company; Western Casualty & Surety Company, which had
issued a "garage" liability policy to one Carl Cantwell, dib/a Carl's Used
Cars; and Fidelity & Casualty Company, which had issued a "garage" liability policy to one Elliott P. Young, dibla Elliott P. Young Enterprises.3
1. 441 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1969).
2. § 379.195(1), (2), RSMo 1969;
1. In respect to every contract of insurance made between an insurance company, person, firm or association, whether a stock, a mutual, a reciprocal or other company, association, or organization, and any person,
firm or corporation, by which such person, firm or corporation is insured
against loss or damage on account of the bodily injury or death or

damage to property by accident of any person, for which loss or
damage such person, firm or corporation is responsible, whenever a
loss occurs on account of a casualty covered by such contract of insurance,
the liability of the insurance company, if liability there be, shall become
absolute, and the payment of said loss shall not depend upon the satisfaction by the assured of a final judgment against him for loss, or
damage, or death, or if the insured becomes insolvent or discharged in
bankruptcy during the period that the policy is in operation or any part
is due or unpaid, occasioned by said casualty.
2. No such contract of insurance shall be cancelled or annulled
by any agreement between the insurance company and the assured
after the said assured has become responsible for such loss or damage,
and any such cancellation or annullment shall be void.
§ 379.200, RSMo 1969:
Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any person, firm
or corporation by any person, including administrators or executors,
for loss or damage on account of bodily injury or death, or damage to
property if the defendant in such action was insured against said loss
or damage at the time when the right of action arose, the judgment
creditor shall be entitled to have the insurance money, provided for in
the contract of insurance between the insurance company, person, firm
or association as described in section 379.195, and the defendant, applied
to the satisfaction of the judgment, and if the judgment is not satisfied
within thirty days after the date when it is rendered, the judgment
creditor may proceed in equity against the defendant and the insurance
company to reach and apply the insurance money to the satisfaction
of the judgment.
3. See Terbell, Automobile Garage Liability Policy, 1954 INS. L. J.

668, 671-72 (1954), for an excellent analysis of the comprehensive

coverage afforded by a typical automobile garage liability policy; Annot.,
93 A.L.R.2d 1047 (1964).
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The essence of plaintiffs' contention in the first count was that McMasters
was the omnibus insured and permissive user under each respective policy.
In the second and third counts plaintiffs sought in the alternative to
establish their claim against MFA Mutual Insurance Company under the
uninsured motorist coverage of its policy issued to a Mrs. Greer, who was
the actual owner of the automobile in which plaintiffs were riding at the
time of the accident.
McMasters was the Buick's last possessor in a complex chain of possession. Carl Cantwell had first obtained possession and title. He subsequently purported to sell it to Raymond Edwards, who procured a
loan from Commercial Credit Company to cover a portion of the sale
price; in return, Edwards executed a purchase money chattel mortgage.
Partially as the result of misrepresentations made by Cantwell to Edwards
regarding the precise terms of the transaction, Edwards defaulted in his
payments. Commercial Credit repossessed the Buick alleging that Cantwell,
because of these misrepresentations to Edwards, was personally liable for
the remaining payments. Cantwell refused to pay, and eventually the car
passed into the custody of Elliott Young, who subsequently sold it to the
parents of McMasters without the Missouri certificate of title which still
remained in Cantwell's possession. 4 The McMasters did not obtain the
certificate of title until two or three days after the accident.
Of the various arguments made by the defendant insurance companies
as to why their respective policies either did not cover McMasters or provided only limited coverage, 5 this note will deal with two. First, Zurich
stated that it could not be held legally accountable to satisfy the unpaid
judgment rendered against McMasters, since neither he nor Commercial
Credit had provided timely notice of the accident.6 Second, both Western
4. This procedure violated § 301.210(1), (2), (4), RSMo 1969.
5. Zurich, Western, and Fidelity all argued that Bobby McMasters was not an
omnibus insured under their respective policies, contending that he was not
operating the Buick with the permission of the named insureds. In addition,
Fidelity specially contended that it was not liable under its "garage" contract
with Young to reimburse plaintiffs because the auto was not being used (at the
time of the accident) for the purpose of "garage operations". Western also asserted
that the car was not being operated for "business purposes" under Cantwell's
"garage" policy. Zurich, on the other hand, alleged that plaintiffs did not sustain
their burden of proving that the Buick was being maintained or used in connection
with a resale following a "legal" repossesion, which its policy required for coverage.
6. The basis of this view is the requisite of providing an insurer with an
opportunity to make a timely and adequate investigation of all the circumstances
surrounding the accident. 8 J. APPLEIMLAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4731
(1962). See also Certified Indem. Co. v. Thun, 439 P.2d 28, 30 (Colo. 1968).
There always exists the distinct possibility that pertinent facts, essential for
the adequate defense of the insured, will be unavailable to the insurer by reason
of the possible removal or lapse of memory of the witnesses to the accident.
Western Freight Ass'n v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 255 F.Supp. 858, 862 (W.D. Pa.
1966), affd, 371 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1967). Cf. Johnson Ready-Mix Constr. Co. v.
United Pac. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 279, 281-82, 358 P.2d 337, 338-39 (1961),
where the concept of the reciprocity of the benefit to the insurer and insured
from the provision requiring notice has been considered.
With the resulting paucity of relevant factual information, an insurer would
be unable to complete a thorough examination of the accident. Hypothetically,
a thorough investigation of the accident's origins, it is argued, would lead to a
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and Fidelity maintained that, even if Zurich were to be relieved of liability,
it still represented "valid and collectible other insurance," and, therefore,
could be conunder the terms of their own policies, Zurich's policy limits
7
sidered in pro-rating any judgment rendered against them.
The court held against Western and Fidelitys but sustained Zurich's
contention that it should be relieved of liability because of a failure to
receive timely notice. In holding in favor of plaintiffs on the issue of notice,
the court noted that plaintiff's attorney had notified Commercial Credit
and Zurich four days after successfully ascertaining the existence of the
Zurich policy. Assuming arguendo that a lack of diligence could not be
imputed to the plaintiffs, the court based its decision on the trial court's
finding, as a matter of law, that Zurich was actually prejudiced by the nontender of timely notice. 9
greater proportion of reasonable compromises and settlements, avoiding unnecessary litigation. It must be noted in passing, however, that the nucleus of
the rationale for providing reasonable and timely notice of an accident or suit to
an insurer is the hypothesis that the personal injury action is fraught with the
possibility of attempted fraud, collusion, or cupidity, by the insured or third
party instigating the suit. J. AEL.xMAN, supra.
7. Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 15, 38 (Mo. 1969).
8. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions in favor
of the plaintiffs and Zurich on count one, and in favor of MFA Mutual on counts
two and three. The court ascertained that McMasters was an omnibus insured
under Zurich's, Western's, and Fidelity's policies. To accomplish this the court
first applied a definition of "garage" in the liability policies' "automobile hazards"
provisins to comprise the various operations of an automoble sales agency. McMasters' exclusive use of the Buick was deemed to be incidental to the operations
of the respective insureds' automobile sales agencies. The court likewise reaffirmed the generally accepted rule that, for purposes of the application of an
omnibus clause, a sale is a legal nullity where the title has not been technically
transferred, although in all other respects the sale is complete. Since Cantwell
retained the certificate of title until after the accident, McMasters was found to
be operating the automobile with the implied permission of Cantwell and pursuant to the sales functions of his used car business. Finally, the court determined
that "repossession" under Zurich's policy with Commercial Credit was to be
tested by the "common understanding and speech of men" and did not refer to
any technical procedure. Thus, the court held that the Buick was dearly repossessed by Commercial Credit although Edwards willingly gave up its possession,
repossession being construed simply as the act of resuming the possession of
property when the purchaser fails to make the required payments.
9. Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 15, 28 (Mo. 1969). Three considerations pervade the analysis of the decision in the instant case. First, Zurich
presented clear testimony on the ways in which it had been prejudiced in the
preliminary investigation of the accident, in selection of trial counsel, and by
negation of a possibility of settlement prior to judgment. It used the testimony
of two attorneys, ostensibly in the same manner as an expert medical witness
might be utilized to describe the procedures of an intricate operation, to
demonstrate what procedures were ordinarily followed in the preparation of
a defense for an insured in a personal injury suit. By the use of such a method,
the adverse effects to this preparation from a long delay in receiving notice, and
consequently its prejudice in the case, could be more dearly drawn for the court.
Second, the court stated, "the trial court's judgment in this regard cannot be said
to be clearly erroneous and is affirmed." Id. at 33 (emphasis added). The court
expressly recognized that, while the trial court had found as a matter of law that
Zurich had been prejudiced by the delay, the record indicated sufficient evidence
of prejudice to permit the judgment to stand. However, the court succinctly
noted that:
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Historically, courts, in determining the legal effect of a failure to
provide notice of an accident or casualty loss within the time period provided by the insurance policy's terms, established the precept that strict
or substantial compliance with the policy's provisions was a prerequisite
to an insurer's liability. 10 Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the United States
Supreme Court in Riddlesbargerv. Hartford Insurance Co., noted in dictum that "[t]he conditions in policies requiring notice of the loss to be
given, and proofs of the amount to be furnished the insurer within certain prescribed periods, must be strictly complied with to enable the
assured to recover.""1 Typical of the early Missouri decisions echoing2
this basic tenet of contract theory was Hicks v. Empire Insurance Co.,1
wherein the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that, in the absence of a waiver
by the insurer of a condition precedent of the policy, substantial fulfillment
of the condition by the insured was essential to the maturation of the insurer's obligation of payment for a casualty loss.
Yet, Missouri courts sought early to incorporate a modicum of equity
into its judicially prescribed law by readily finding an insurer's waiver
of the condition precedent. In Barnham v. Royal Insurance Co.' 3 the
policy required the immediate notice of a casualty loss under the policy.
The fire, which resulted in the destruction of plaintiff's property, struck
on December 18, 1893; notice to the insurer was forwarded on January 4,
1894. The court indicated that such an "untimely" delay might be noncompliance with the policy's provisions, but did not squarely decide the
point, since the court found a waiver of the condition in the insurer's
14
general denial of liability after having received notice of the loss.
5
Finally, in Dezell v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.1 the Missouri Supreme
Court drew a distinction between insurance policies which explicitly provided for an automatic forfeiture of rights under the contract, if the insured was not able to comply strictly with the policy's provisions, and those
which provided for no such forfeiture. 16 The court held that where forfeiture was not explicitly prescribed in the contract, a court should consider the consequences that result from the failure to give notice before
[o]rdinarily whether a delay by the insured in notifying the liability
insurer of an accident and in forwarding suit papers constitutes a
material breach of the policy conditions is a fact issue to be determined
on the particular facts of each case.
Id. at 31-32. Third, since the court determined that the policies of Western and
Fidelity were applicable to the accident, the judicial formality of concluding that
the Zurich policy was valid and collectible was equitably unnecessary.
10. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386 (1868).
11. Id. at 890.
12. 6 Mo. App. 254, 259 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878). See Winterton v. Van Zandt,
851 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1961), where the court reaffirmed this basic precept.
13. 75 Mo. App. 394 (St. L. Ct. App. 1898).
14. Id. at 899. See also La Force v. William's City Fire Ins. Co., 43 Mo. App.
518 (K.C. Ct. App. 1891); Haggard v. German Ins. Co., 58 Mo. App. 98 (St. L. Ct.
App. 189).
15. 176 Mo.253, 281-82, 75 S.W. 1102, 1119 (1903).
16. Id. Ostensibly, a forfeiture of rights should be elicited if the courts
would apply "pure" principles of contract theory to each factual situation in
which a deviation from the contract terms has resulted.
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declaring that policy rights were forfeited. 17 Since courts are powerless to
strike out forfeiture provisions which have been inserted and agreed to by
the parties in insurance contracts, the Missouri Supreme Court reasoned
that they should be likewise powerless to insert, judicially, such conditions
into a contract.' 8 The concomitant of such reasoning has been the formulation of the rule that forfeiture of rights under an insurance policy is
not favored by Missouri law, especially when an insurer is seeking a forfeiture after the happening of the precise event which would otherwise
give rise to the insurer's liability.19
Within this general background Missouri courts eventually shifted
their attention from attempting to perceive an insurer's waiver of the contract's notice provisions to an approach which, in the absence of material
prejudice to the insurer from a non-compliance with the time provided for
notice in the policy, would enforce the contract provisions. In Dixon v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 20 the St. Louis Court of Appeals
clearly indicated that material prejudice to the insurer from the insured's
non-compliance would be required before an insurer could deny its contractual obligations. Dixon thus reaffirmed dictum to the same effect
17. Dixon v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 155 S.W.2d 313, 317 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1941). Greer has rejuvenated Dixon's equitable doctrine of considering
all the surrounding circumstances in decidin& whether there was a reasonable
excuse for not giving prompt notice of an accident or pending suit. The growth
of this rule can be attributed, in part, to the reliance in Dixon, as in earlier
cases, on the premise of not finding a forfeiture explicitly stated in the policy.
18. In German Ins. Co. v. Davis, 40 Neb. 700, 59 N.W. 698 (1894), the
insurance company inserted the condition that a failure to comply with the
contract's provisions within the time prescribed therefor would result in a forfeiture
of all claims under the policy. Six years later the Nebraska Supreme Court, in
Northern Ass. Co. v. Hanna, 60 Neb. 29, 82 N.W. 97 (1900), held that the court
was not authorized to supply an insurance contract with a forfeiture provision
by construction where no forfeiture was expressly provided by the parties. The
results in the Davis and Hanna decisions were distinguished on the presence in
the former case of the explicit forfeiture provision.
19. Loduca v. St. Paul Fire SeMarine Ins. Co., 105 S.W.2d 1011, 1013 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1937), as modified on rehearing;Walker v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Mo.
App. 1202, 1217, 1219, 70 S.W.2d 82, 88, 89 (St. L. Ct. App. 1934); St. Paul &
Kansas City S. L. R.R. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 231 Mo. App. 613,
628-29, 105 S.W.2d 14, 24-25 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937). Missouri courts, as
delineated in the Walker case, make a theoretical distinction between a condition
precedent and a technical forfeiture clause in an insurance contract. A condition
precedent must be complied with before an insurer's duty to perform accrues. A
forfeiture is equated with a condition subsequent. In, this instance an insurer's
duty to perform exists because of the happening of the event for which the policy
was aquired, yet, because of the non-compliance with the condition, the insurer
is relieved of the obligation to act. Abstractly, this might explain why nearly
every modem insurer makes notice within prescribed time limit a condition
precedent, and why insurers dislike declaring an actual "forfeiture" of the policy.
First, it would mean that no outstanding obligation exists to execute the contract.
Second, it avoids using a term for which the courts have expressed such disdain.
In practice, however, this author sees no distinction between the terms. It would
seem that the modern trend is to avoid such useless discussions. The significant
factor is whether, under whatever theory one approaches the case, the named
insured or a third party trying to collect for injuries sustained through the
negligence of the named insured will be denied recovery on the policy.
20. Dixon v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 155 S.W.2d 313, 317 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1941).
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21
contained in Walker v. American Automobile Insurance Co. Following
the rationale of Dezell and Dixon, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, applying Missouri law, produced a series of opinions
which indicated that the materiality of the prejudice will determine an
insurer's faculty to circumvent liability under the contract.2 2 Indicative
of these decisions was Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Coleman,23 in
which the court held that the Missouri rule prevented defeat of an insured's rights under a liability policy unless it contained a proviso for 24a
forfeiture of rights upon non-compliance with the terms of the policy.
In dictum the court indicated that in the absence of such a proviso an
insurer would be required to demonstrate actual, material prejudice. The
most important facet of such a rule is that the courts should assiduously
weigh the evidence to determine whether the insurer has in fact been so
26
prejudiced.
In spite of this determination, the St. Louis Court of Appeals, in
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Independence Mutual Insurance
Northwestern
Co., 26 held that where a condition by the clear and unambiguous language
of the policy is explicitly made a condition precedent, "compliance with
such condition is necessary, and non-compliance entitles the insurer to
deny liability under its policy." 27 The court further noted:

21. 229 Mo. App. 1202, 1217, 70 S.W.2d 82, 88 (St. L. Ct. App. 1934).
22. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Davis, 277 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1960).
23. 186 F.2d 40, 44 (8th Cir. 1950). See also Campbell v. Continental Cas.
Co. of Chicago, 170 F.2d 669, 673-74 (8th Cir. 1948); Powell v. Home Indem. Co.,
343 F.2d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 1965).
Of special import was the decision in Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Davis,
277 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1960). In this case the trial court ruled that under Missouri
law an insurer could not deny its contractual liability by reason of a delay in
obtaining timely notice of an accident, unless the insurer proved that the breach
resulted in its prejudice. The trial court held that the insurer was not prejudiced
because of its lack of diligence in interviewing the patrolman who investigated
the accident, and in obtaining an accident report.
It is submitted that this lack of diligence may be one ill-desired concomitant
of the emphasis of Missouri courts on the necessity of an insurer's showing
prejudice to escape liability. In a sense it is the converse of the equitable "dean
hands" doctrine. The prime way that an insurer can ensure that it will be able
to demonstrate prejudice is to be tardy in its investigation of the accident,
especially where the insurer has reason to believe that witnesses and tangible forms
of evidence are still readily available.
24. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Davis, 277 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1960).
25. Miller v. Lindgate Developers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 980, 983 (E.D. Mo.
1967). Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Davis, 277 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1960), and
Powell v. Home Indem. Co., 343 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1965), are cited as controlling

precedents. In Miller the insureds, builders, did not provide their insurer, Home
Indemnity Company, prompt notice of the deterioration of the foundation and

roof of a new home sold to plaintiff until they realized these occurrences were
covered under the operations clause of their comprehensive general insurance

policy. In the garnishment action against the insurer, on the unpaid balance of

the judgment, plaintiff alleged that if the insurer had taken over Lindgate's
defense upon reception of notice of the accident, the delay in giving notice would
not have had any prejudicial or adverse effects on the case. The court held for
the plaintiffs, since the insurer had not alleged, nor proved, that the delay in
giving notice had any unduly prejudicial effects on the case.
26. 319 S.W.2d 898 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959).
27. Id. at 902.
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Where the condition is expressly made a condition precedent, the
insurer is relieved of liability whether or not the2 insurer
has been
8
injured or prejudiced by the breach of condition.
This decision was adhered to by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Waters v. American Automobile Insurance Co.2 9 That
court, in essaying to apply Missouri law3 0 and relying on Northwestern
Mutual, held that Missouri courts would not disregard the existence, or
deem unreasonable or ineffective, a condition precedent in a liability
insurance policy.31 In dictum the court succeeded in discrediting prior
decisions of the Eighth Circuit, 32 particularly Western Casualty & Surety
Co. v, Coleman,3 and Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Davis.3 4 Thus
the court appeared to indicate a trend toward viewing an insurer's prejudice as immaterial in the determination of its contractual liability.
On the other hand, in Cockrell v. FarmersMutual Automobile Insurance
Co.3 5 the Kansas City Court of Appeals observed that, while the presence
of a notice provision in a liability policy obviously looked to an avoidance
of liability by an insurer when the insured did not properly comply with
its terms, Missouri courts had in the past consistently refused, in the
absence of any showing of prejudice to the insurer, to regard such a provision as a condition which defeats recovery or avoids liability by reason
of the failure to give notice within the time stipulated.38 Cockrell severely
questioned the rationale underlying Northwestern Mutual and pointed
out that the rule espoused there was diametrically opposed to the older
rulings that, in the absence of a clear qualification providing for a forfeiture of the insured's rights, avoidance of liability by the insurer would
not be judicially allowed unless there was an affirmative indication of
37
prejudice to the insured.
Given the confused development of the view that an insurer must
28. Id.
29. 363 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
30. Id. at 686. The court reasoned that since no conflicts existed between
the law of Missouri and the law applied in the District of Columbia (a dubious
conclusion unless one concentrates upon and limit the scope of review solely to
Northwestern Mutual), it did not need to make a choice between the precedents
to be applied in the case.
For a criticism of the authorities and rationale underlying Northwestern
Mutual, see Cockrell v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 427 S.W.2d 303, 306 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1968).
31. Waters v. American Auto Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 684, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
32. Id. at 689. This court noted that Western Gas & Sur. Co. v. Coleman,
186 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1950), was decided before Northwestern Mutual; therefore,
since Northwestern Mutual explicitly decided the issue contra to prior authorities,
judicial reliance should not be placed upon its legal analysis of the prejudice
issue. As to Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Davis, 277 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1960), the
court hypothesized that though it was decided after Northwestern Mutual, it was
accepted by opposing counsel in the case as still controlling law, and the court
did not undertake an independent review of the Missouri decisions.
33. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Coleman, 186 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1950).
34. 277 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1960).
35. 427 S.W.2d 303 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968).
36. Id. at 306.
37. Id.
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show actual prejudice, Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co. 38 sheds a ray of clear, unambiguous light upon this troubled area. Although the Missouri Supreme
Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's finding that Zurich was prejudiced by the forty-month delay in receiving notice of the accident, the
court explicitly ruled that "on the evidence in this case we cannot say
as a matter of law that Zurich was relieved of liability solely because of
the delay in giving notice." 39 Moreover, the court clearly overruled the
determination in Northwestern Mutual that the insurer need not be
with an express condition
prejudiced by the insured's non-compliance
4°
precedent in order to escape liability.
The Greer decision brings Missouri squarely in line with the so-called
"minority" of jurisdictions which require an insurer's affirmative showing
of prejudice in order to circumvent its liability, irrespective of the insured's
failure to comply with a condition precedent. 41 Historically, courts of equity
refrained from reading a forfeiture of rights into a contract unless expressly
provided by its terms, envisioning a basic conceptual difference between
the effects of a failure to perform a condition precedent and a complete
forfeiture of rights. Today, courts of the "minority" viewpoint follow a
similar rationale.
Logically no duty to perform under a contract will accrue unless all
conditions precedent to the policy are fulfilled. 42 Nevertheless, these courts,
in pursuit of a more equitable result, have somewhat arbitrarily determined
that the breach of a condition precedent is not a forfeiture. To arrive at
this position, the "minority" courts are forced to significantly reform the
contract, in that if a policy's notice provision is merely espoused as a condition precedent to avoidance of liability on the policy, prejudice will be a
factor in determining whether the delay in giving notice was reasonable
under all the circumstances of the case. The nexus between the existence
or non-existence of prejudice to the insurer and ascertainment of whether
the insured was reasonably diligent in providing the insurer with notice
of the accident has been succinctly elucidated in Sutton Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Notre Dame Arena, Inc. 43 This case indicates that prejudice to an
38. 441 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1969).
39. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 443, 448 (1951); 44 Am. JUR. 2d, Insurance § 1463
(1969). This rule is predicated upon the hypothesis that:
there is much more at stake than the fact that there is a dispute between
the insurer and the insured over the terms of the insurance contract.
Third parties are involved who may suffer greivous damage and
financial hardship if this policy is held ineffective .... The law is well-

recognized . ..that insurance policies are to be liberally construed, if
possible, to effectuate coverage and protection to those for whose benefit
the policy is issued.
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lutkie, 292 F.Supp. 119, 124 (D. Kan. 1968).
42. See note 16, supra.
43. 108 N.H. 437, 440, 237 A.2d 676, 678-79 (1968) (citations omitted).
The insurer in this case was not permitted to deny its liability because of a delay
in obtaining notice of an accident which produced an injury to a spectator at
defendant's hockey arena, notwithstanding the fact that defendant's president
and assistant treasurer has obtained actual knowledge of the accident, yet failed

to notify the plaintiff the three months following the accident. Cf. Cinq-Mars v.
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insurer from not having received timely notice is a factor in determining
whether notice of the accident was forwarded within a reasonable time,
or whether the insured has committed a substantial breach of the contract
by failing to give notice as soon as practicable.
Under the "minority" view the burden of showing prejudice is generally placed upon the insurer. 44 This would seem to be in line with the
basic philosophy that until prejudice is shown, the insured's right to recover under the policy still exists. The alternative, which places the burden
on the insured to adduce evidence showing that the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay in obtaining notice, 45 infers that violation of the condition precedent does, in fact, prevent an insurer's duty of performance
from arising. While this is more in line with traditional contract law, it
still does not meet the purpose for which the equitable reformation noted
above was devised-the continuation of coverage for the insured.
A "majority" of courts follow the rule that prejudice is immaterial in
a consideration of an insurer's rights and obligations under the policy,
contending that:
the argument that unless prejudice results from the delay, the full
purpose of the provision is accomplished, ignores the practicalities
of the situation. There may be a vast difference between prejudice
and judicially establishing prejudice, especially where the question
is treated as one of fact for the jury. What would have happened
with regard to investigation and possible settlement
would be ex40
tremely difficult to show by positive evidence.
Two premises are readily evident as bases for this formulation. First, the
natural reluctance of courts to reform an insurance contract demands
that traditional contract principles be utilized in a construction of the
policy. This prevents conflicting decisions, occasioned by only infinitesimally differing fact situations, within a particular jurisdiction. Second, the
Travelers
argued: Ins. Co., 100 R.I. 603, 611, 218 A.2d 467, 471 (1966), where the court
[I]n this state and generally elsewhere the condition
of timely notice
is satisfied if the insured acts diligently and with reasonable dispatch
in the light of all the circumstances and facts of the particular case.
[emphasis added and citations omitted.]
Presumably, the absence -of presence of an insurer's prejudice could be included
in such a determination. See also Fox v. Nat'l. Say. Ins. Co., 424 P.2d 19 (Okla.
1967); 8 J. APPLEmAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4734 (1962).
44. Frank v. Nash, 166 Pa. Super. 476, 71 A.2d 835 (1950); Temple v. Harper,
200 So. 2d 749 (La. App. 1967). Implicit in this determination is a showing by
the insured of a reasonable excuse for not giving prompt notice. Henderson v.
Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 252 Iowa 97, 106 N.W.2d 86 (1960).
45. 8 J. AP..LEmAN, supra note 43. This approach is analogous to the California rule under which prejudice to an insurer is presumed. Such a presumption
can be countered, however, by an affirmative demonstration by the insured that
the insurer, in fact, had not been prejudiced. In Wasson v. Atd. Nat'l. Ins. Co.,
207 Cal. App. 2d 464, 468, 24 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (1962), the court noted that,
where one of two possible insurers of an accident had not received notice until
thirteen months ater the accident, notice was not necessarily untimely, if the
additional insured had given notice as soon as he knew, or should have known
by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that he was covered by the second policy.
•
46. Note, 12 ArA. L. Rxv. 406,411 (1960).
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theory evidences an inherent fear that an insurer may be forced to proceed under the contract. Since it is presumed that juries tend to find pertinent fact issues against defendants covered by insurance, the jury will
find notice which complies with the policy terms where there in fact was
none. By applying the standards of the "majority" view, a court is merely
faced with the uncomplicated and undemanding task of applying contract
principles to the case before it.47
Diametrically opposed to the "majority" rule, but not directly in line
with the "minority" view, is the liberal, legislatively defined program of
insurance laws which has been adopted in New York.48 In essence, the
salient New York statute provides that if the insured can show that it
was not reasonably possible for him to notify his insurer within the prescribed time limit in the policy, a clause devised to prevent an insured's
recovery, in the absence of full compliance with all the conditions precedent,
would not necessarily invalidate his claim under the contract. The statute
does require that notice be given as soon as it is reasonably possible to do
so. Primary among the factors which comprise this factual issue is whether
the insured has been reasonably diligent in seeking to learn the identity
of any insurance policy which might cover the accident. 49
The New York statute seems to be a legislative recognition of the
practical problems arising from accidents in which the parties are frequently omnibus insureds of various undisclosed insurance policies. In
these cases a nearly impossible burden is placed upon the injured third
party either to determine all the insurance policies which may cover the
defendant as an additional insured, or to determine whether the defendant,
as the named insured, has provided the insurer with timely notice. This
dilemma is shown with clarity in Florio v. General American Fire & Life
Assurance Corp.50 In that case plaintiff, after having obtained a judgment
in a personal injury suit which remained unsatisfied, attempted to serve
47. A typical example of the strict and oftentimes harsh consequences which
necessarily flow from an application of the "majority" rule can be seen in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 50 Wash 2d 443, 313 P.2d 347
(1957), in which a third party was injured when she fell into a hole left after a
paving job on plaintiff's parking lot. Assuming that no insurance coverage was
involved, plaintiff, a self-insurer, undertook preparation of its own defense of the
personal injury action. But, having determined that the defect was left by one
of plaintiff's licenses concessioners and that defendant's policy covered the
licensee's negligence, plaintiff immediately forwarded notice of the accident to
its insurer. Even though no evidence of the unavailability of any material witness
to the accident was presented, and in spite of the fact that a continuance probably
could have been taken in the case, the court preferred to rule that the fourteen
month delay in giving notice was a failure to fulfill the condition precedent of
giving notice "as soon as practicable," and relieved the insurer of its liability

under the policy.

However, less harsh results have been effectuated by an application of the
"majority" viewpoint. See Am. Fire &cGas. Co. v. Tankersley, 270 Ala. 126, 116
So. 2d 579 (1959); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 121 So. 2d 175 (Fla.
App. 1960); Am. Fire &cGas. Co. v. Collura, 163 So. 2d 784 (Fla. App. 1964);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227, 216 P.2d 606 (1950).
48. N. Y. INSURAwcEc LAw 167 (1) (d) (McKinney 1966).
49. Floria v. Gen. Accident Fire gcLife Ass. Corp., 396 F.2d 510, 518 (2d

Cir. 1968).
50. Id.
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the named insured with a subpoena in order to learn the name of any
insurance company with whom he had contracted, but the named insured
died without revealing the name of the insurer. An action against the insured's sons two years later, for alleged fraudulent conspiracy to conceal
the existence of insurance coverage, revealed no insurance coverage of
record. Finally, fifteen years after the accident, defendant's insurer was
discovered and notice was given of the accident for the first time. Defendant was estopped to plead the statute of limitations 51 as a bar to the
action, and by reason of the New York insurance statute, plaintiff recovered
from the insurers.
It should be indicated, however, that, in the absence of a reasonably
diligent effort by the insured in determining the existence of the insurance coverage, a forfeiture would be technically possible. On this point
New York policy would seem to resemble the "majority" approach. On the
other hand, the statute's explicit attempt to provide the most extensive
coverage possible more closely approximates the underlying policy of the
"minority" rule, in that both the New York and "minority" rules have, as
their basic tenet, the conscious attempt to mitigate the harsh effects of
forfeiture on an injured party seeking to enforce the coverage contained in
the insured's policy.
In two respects, nevertheless, the New York and "minority" approaches
are divergent. First, a reasonable excuse for non-compliance constitutes
a valid reason for non-forfeiture under the New York statutory scheme.
Under the "minority" viewpoint if an insured has given a reasonable excuse
for non-compliance with the conditions precedent of the policy, liability
will be predicated upon the absence of prejudice to the insurer. Second,
and more importantly, in New York the burden of proving a reasonable
excuse for non-compliance (i.e. reasonable diligence in ascertaining the
existence of insurance coverage) is clearly upon the insured. In "minority"
jurisdictions the insurer bears the burden of proving actual, material prejudice. Thus, it is evident that in Missouri, unlike New York, reasonable
excuse is not itself a defense to non-compliance with a policy's conditions
precedent. Moreover, even in the absence of a plausible explanation for an
insured's inaction in providing notice within the policy's terms, Missouri
courts manifest an equitable tendency to hold insurers to the policy's coverage, provided they can demonstrate no actual prejudice. Practically, a
reasonable excuse of an insured's tardiness would generate closer scrutiny
by the courts of the circumstances surrounding the non-compliance to
discern whether, in fact, the insurer was prejudiced by the delay.
Cases from some "majority and minority" jurisdictions, which seemingly argue for an equitable result approximating the decision in Florio 2
51. Florio v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Ass. Corp., 596 F.2d 510, 514 (2d
Cir. 1968).
52. Continental Cas. Co. v. Shoffstoll, 198 So. 2d 654, 655 (Fla. App. 1967);
Nat'l. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Cypret, 207 Ark. 11, 17, 179 S.W.2d 161, 164 (1944). In
Castanzo v. Pennsylvania Threshermen &Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 262,
272, 152 A.2d 589, 594 (1959), where the court remanded for a determination
whether, in fact, the additional insured did know, or have reason to know, that
he came within defendant's policy coverage; Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Manson, 94 N.H. 389, 54 A.2d 580 (1947).
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should not be given excessive weight. Without the benefit of legislative
fiat, few courts will be able to escape assiduously applying more conventional contract principles to the particular cases before them. The judicial
reformation of an insurance contract, achieved by an application of the
"minority" rule, would seem, in the final analysis, to proceed as far as a
court can practically travel.
The second important holding of Greer was that since Zurich was
relieved of liability by reason of its not having received timely notice of
the accident, its policy could not be considered valid and collectible other
insurance in a delineation of the pro-rata liability of the three insurers. 53
Since the plaintiffs had apparently made a valiant effort to discover the
existence of all collectible insurance, the court, instead of applying a fixed
rule to determine the existence of valid and collectible other insurance,
declared that the uncollectibility of an insurance claim should not be determined as of any particular date. Rather, its uncollectibility should be
determined by weighing the consequences which would ensue from making
54
this determination.
Basically, a pro-rata other insurance clause aids an insurer by stipulating that if other insurance also covers the accident, the insurer shall not
be liable for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of
liability of all valid and collectible insurance. 55
The basis for proration according to liability limits rests upon
proper recognition of the respective liabilities that the concurrent
insurers would have incurred were it not for purely fortuitous circumstance of the "other insurance." As a method of apportionment, it assures indemnification for the insured up to the maximum amount of coverage afforded by either policy. 53
The crucial question in Greer was at what time the valid and collectible

53. 441 S.W.2d 15, 33 (Mo. 1969). If the court had not so held both
Western's and Fidelity's liability would have been substantially curtailed since
Zurich's policy had the highest maximum coverage. Ultimately the consequence
of finding Zurich's insurance valid and collectible would have prevented plaintiffs from receiving compensation to the full extent of their injuries.
54. Id. at 34.
55. Watson, The "Other Insurance" Dilemma, 1966 INs. L. J. 151, 152 (1966).
56. Note, 65 COLuM. L. R.v. 319, 330 (1965).

When two insurance contracts contain differing "other insurance" clauses,
e.g., where insurance policy A contains a pro-rata clause, while policy B contains
an excess clause, an application problem arises as to which clause should be
considered primary and which one secondary. While recognizing the difference
in the two caues, the "majority" view is to attempt to decipher the interest of
the contracting parties and to give full effect to this intent, i.e., an excess provision
alone controls in every situation which falls within its terms; a pro-rata provision
governs in all other situations. Consol. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bankers Co. of Pennsylvania, 244 Md. 392, 400, 223 A.2d 594, 599 (1966). But see Arditi v. Massachusetts
Bonding e Ins. Co., 315 S.W.2d 736, 742 (Mo. 1958).
Missouri apparently follows the "minority", or Oregon, rule which disregards
both clauses as mutually repugnant and proportions loss as if neither policy has
an "other insurance" clause. This result has been subsequently "distinguished" in
the closely analogous fact situation of Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Western
Cas. & Sur. Co., 337 S.W.2d 566, 576 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
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other insurance should be determined for the purpose of proportioning
liability coverage. The question is a novel one in Missouri law.
Prior to Greer the only remotely analogous case on this question was
Swaringin v. Allstate Insurance Co.57 The issue in that case was at what
time a defendant's insurance should be considered valid and collectible
with respect to the uninsured motorist coverage in plaintiff's own insurance
policy. Defendant's insurer had been officially declared insolvent subsequent to the accident, and it could not satisfy the judgment rendered against
its insured. Plaintiff contended that his uninsured motorist coverage included any automobile covered by insurance that could not be put to practical use by the injured plaintiff. The court, after finding that the words of
the policy were clear and unambiguous, cited Hardin v. American Mutual
Fire Insurance Co.58 for the proposition that plaintiff's cause of action
under the uninsured motorist coverage must be determined by the facts
existing at the time of the collision and that defendant's insurance was
valid and collectible at that time. The analogy, albeit a remote one, would
be that in Greer the presence of valid and collectible other insurance should
have been determined from the circumstances existing at the time of the
accident, and at that time the tortfeasor had valid and collectible other
insurance from Zurich.
Though Greer is a case of first impression in Missouri, two other jurisdictions have wrestled with a similar issue. In Friedfeld v. Royal Indemnity
Co. a Florida appellate court held that an insurance policy's collectibility
was to be ascertained at the time of the accident.5 9 A directly contrary decision was reached in Gros v. Houston Fire 6 Casualty Insurance Co. 60 A
Louisiana Court of Appeals in Gros distinguished Friedfeld on the ground
that in Friedfeld the policies were legal and valid at all times, the one
policy only becoming uncollectible through the negligence of the insured
in failing to furnish timely notice of the accident. 61 Thus, the existence of
valid and collectible other insurance was deemed to be judged by the con62
ditions prevailing at the time of the judgment.
57. 399 S.W.2d 131 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
58. 261 N.C. 67, 73, 134 S.E.2d 142, 147 (1964).
For cases directly contra see Katz v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co., 244 Cal. App. 2d
886, 53 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1966) ; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va.
887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
59. 167 So. 2d 586 (Fla. App. 1964). This holding led to a harsh result. One
of the pro rata insurers was not forced to assume liability because of the insured's
failure to provide notice of the accident. The appellee insurer was ultimately responsible for only twenty percent coverage since the insurer held not liable for
any coverage had the greater policy limits, which were used to establish appellee's
pro-rata liability. Cf. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vines, 193 So. 2d 180 (Fla. App.

1966). While following the result in Friedfeld, the court in Vines did recognize

the unfortunate determinations which possibly could result from the application
of the rule. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vines, supra at 182. But to this writer it
seems evident, from even a cursory reading of the case, that Vines dearly followed
the result in Friedfeld, and that statements to the contrary (Note, 14 Loy. L. RIv.
243, 249 (1968)), are untenable.

60. 195 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 1967), writ refused, 250 La. 644, 197 So. 2d

898 (1967).
61. Id. at 676.

. 62. This result has been concurred in by the court on rehearing in Beauregard
v. Salmon, 205 So. 2d 634 (La. App. 1967), writ refused, 252 La. 883, 214 So. 2d
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/8
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Although the Missouri Supreme Court in Greer tacitly followed the
reasoning of Gros, the court's determination on the crucial issue seems
somewhat open-ended. The court urged that "the uncollectibility of an insurance claim should not be required as of any fixed time but the end
result (i.e. whether it operates to the detriment of the injured third party)
should be determinative."6 3 In addition, a precise delineation of the rule
was made more difficult by the Court's reasoning that:
the Zurich policy was not "valid and collectible insurance" as that
term is used in the policies because its existence was not known to
McMasters or the Greers through no fault of their own and could
not reasonably have been discovered by them before it was too late
to render it valid and collectible insurance with respect to their
claim. 64
In conclusion, Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co.6 5 has placed Missouri among
the "minority" of courts which require an insurer to demonstrate actual
prejudice from not having received timely notice of an accident or pending
suit before it can deny its liability under an insurance contract. Though
the rule does violence to established and traditional norms of contractual
interpretation, the equitable justifications for extending wider coverage
to insureds and injured third parties merits the inclusion of this additional
requirement for denial of liability. The prejudice rule, nevertheless, is not
a panacea for it is obvious that an inequitable result might easily have occurred in the instant case had there not been two additional insurers to
provide adequate coverage.
It is submitted that Missouri has judically extended coverage as far
as it can in the absence of a clear legislative mandate on the policy objectives to be furthered by the application of automobile liability insurance.
In this light, courts of particular "majority" jurisdictions, while adopting
stricter tests for the interpretation of insurance contracts, have called for
dear legislative guidelines and remedial action where the courts' current
modes of interpretation of the policies and application of their coverage
are legislatively viewed to be inimical to society's objectives in acquiring
wider insurance coverage. 66 The "vanguard" state, New York, has gone
even further than the more liberal minority courts by adopting legislation
to eliminate the possibility of a circumvention of liability under an insurance policy which is predicated upon a failure to comply with a condi550 (1968), where the court singled out Gros as the controlling precedent before
remanding the case for proceedings to determine whether the primary insuarnce
policy was collectible.
63. Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 15, 34 (Mo. 1969). Compare the
language in Dezell v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 176 Mo. 253, 75 S.W. 1102 (1903).
64. Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 15, 34 (Mo. 1969) (emphasis
added). The court in Greer was guided by the proposition which should be
the cardinal rule in applying other insurance benefits to automobile liability
insurance cases, namely, that an insured, or anyone injured through his negligence,
should not receive less coverage than if he were protected by only one of the
policies in question.
65. 441 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1969).
66. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227, 246-47, 216 P.2d
606, 616 (1950).
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tion precedent of the policy, if, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the additional insured or injured third party could not have been expected to comply with it.
Thus, in view of the numerous accidents that occur in which the dependent or injured party is an additional insured within the terms of an
"omnibus" clause, it is hoped that insurers will expressly provide for the
fact that the parties might not be reasonably able to discover the existence
of all the applicable insurance policies in time to give timely notice of the
accident or suit.6 7 In the absence of any self-generated reformation of their
policies, however, insurers should face the real possibility of remedial
legislation to eliminate the onus of this inequitable situation.
Finally, the Missouri Supreme Court has devised a test for determining
the existence of valid and collectible other insurance on an ad hoc basis,
the end result being determined by the exigencies of each case. The uncollectibility of other insurance will clearly not be determined by the application of a "fixed time" rule. It is submitted that had the Greers been
guilty of laxity in attempting to discover the presence of all applicable insurance policies, the court might have been persuaded to apply the reasoning espoused in Friedfeld to the effect that a determination of valid and
collectible insurance was to be ascertained at the time of the accident. As it
stands, however, the rule is sufficiently open-ended to require further court
clarification before a conclusive rule can be formulated.
H.

EDWARD SKINNER

67. See Brown Materials Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Auto. Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d
760, 762, 127 P.2d 51, 52 (1942), where the policy read:
[It being understood that failure to give any notice required to be
given by this Policy, within the time specified therein, shall not
invalidate any claim made by the Assured if it shall be shown not to
have been reasonably possible to give such notice within the prescribed
term and that notice was given as soon as was reasonably possible.
Cf. Montgomery v. Travelers Protective Ass'n of America, 434 S.W.2d 17 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1968). Theoretically, the insurer may be in a better position under this
view than under the current Missouri rule, for the insured would have the
burden of proof to show the reasonableness of his actions. In the meantime
the insurer would be relieved of the burden of proving actual prejudice to
deny successfully its contractual liability.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/8

40

1970]

et al.: Recent Cases
RECENT CASES

AESTHETIC REGULATION AND THE POLICE POWER
Deimeke v. State Highway Commission'
Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action asking that a recently
enacted Missouri statute,2 requiring the licensing of all junkyards along
the primary highways of the state,3 be declared unconstitutional and that
an injunction prohibiting the State Highway Commission from enforcing
it be issued. It was plaintiff's contention that the state cannot use its
police power for aesthetic purposes. 4 The Circuit Court of Cole County
upheld the Act as a valid exercise of State police power and denied injunctive relief. The Supreme Court of Missouri, in affirming, concurred
in the views stated by the Kentucky Court of Appeals:
The police power is as broad and comprehensive as the demands
society make necessary ....
It must keep pace with the changing
concepts of public welfare ....
Certainly the legislature could take
cognizance of... the actual commercial as well as aesthetic value
of our scenic beauty, and the patently offensive character of vehicle
graveyards .... 5
Although the court did not expressly adopt the minority position
that a state's police power may be used for purely aesthetic purposes, the
tenor of the opinion indicates that the Missouri Supreme Court has taken
a step in that direction. The opinion reveals a greater appreciation by
the court of both the importance of aesthetic goals and the role aesthetics
have played in various types of police regulation in the past.
State courts have sustained the use of police power in everything from
the regulation of front yard clotheslines6 to the designation of entire city
blocks as historical districts. 7 The Federal Government in passing the
so-called Highway Beautification Bill,8 offering funds to states to beautify
their highways, spurred the passage of many new state highway beautifi1. 444 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1969).
2. §§ 226.650..720, RSMo 1969.
3. Passed by the Missouri General Assembly in 1966, § 226.650, RSMo 1969
reads as follows:
The General assembly, for the purpose of promoting public safety,
health, welfare, convenience, and enjoyment of highway travel and to
preserve and enhance the natural scenic beauty of highways and
adjacent areas, declares it to be in the public interest to regulate and
restrict or prohibit the establishment, operation, and maintenance of
junkyards in areas adjacent to the interstate and primary systems of
highways in Missouri.
4. Plaintiff had operated a junkyard for eleven years located on Highway
22, a state primary road. He applied for a license, was denied, and brought suit.
5. Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Ky. 1964). In upholding
a statute prohibiting the operation of junkyards within 2000 feet of a road unless
a permit is first obtained and the junkyard is effectively hidden, the court stated
that while public safety may be promoted, "the principle objection is based upon
aesthetic considerations." Ibid.
6. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 784,
appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1968).
7. New Orleans v. Levy, 228 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1958).
8. 23 U.S.C. § 136 (1969).
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cation programs. Many of these acts have resulted in the regulation of
junkyards and billboards along primary highways. Cities have passed billboard and non-accessory advertising ordinances. 9 Municipalities have also
attempted to use their police power to impose architectural controls in
an effort to achieve conformity in the external appearance of structures in
new business and residential districts. 10 Similar attempts have been made
to prevent excessive dissimilarity in homes and buildings proposed in older
areas as well." However, this apparent trend of allowing more police power
12
to regulate the use of private property is by no means universally accepted.
According to the traditional doctrine, a state may not use its police
power to accomplish aesthetic objectives. 13 Infringement on a property
owner's ius utendi was allowed only upon a showing of strong public
necessity. 14 However, the courts soon began to soften this harsh approach.
In Woman's Kansas City St. Andrews Society v. Kansas City,15 a federal
court of appeals expressed the opinion that mere aesthetic considerations
alone would not justify the exercise of police power. However, the court
also indicated that the presence of an aesthetic goal would not invalidate
an otherwise valid regulation. In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United
States 16 expressed an opinion, cited by many state courts, to justify the use
of police power for aesthetic purposes to the effect that:
[t]he concept of public welfare is broad and inconclusive. The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community shall be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well balanced as well as carefully pai
trolled. 7
Justice Douglas stated further that when those who govern the District
of Columbia decide that the nation's capital shall be beautiful as well
as sanitary, there is nothing in the fifth amendment which stands in the
8
way.'
Aesthetics, as a basis for the exercising of police power, was dealt
with in billboard cases as early as 1893.19 Such billboard decisions indi9. Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1967).
10. State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wisland, 269 Wis. 262, 69
N.W.2d 217 cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
11. Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74
(1963).
12. People v. Dickinson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 872, 343 P.2d 809 (1959); State
v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959).
13. Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAw
&

CONTEMP.

PROD.

218 (1955).

14. Syracuse v. Snow, 123 Misc. 568, 205 N.Y.S. 785 (1924).
15. 58 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1932).
16. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Note that what the court said is
dicta. The issue in the case concerned the right of the government to use the
power of eminent domain to take property under the fifth amendment, not the
validity of the regulation.
17. Id. at 33.
18. Id.
19. Crawford v. Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 33 P. 476 (1893). The court invalidated
an ordinance requiring billboards to be a minimum distance from the highway.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/8
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cated that it was unconstitutional to prohibit outdoor advertising merely
because of unsightly signs.2° However, courts soon began to create fictions
in order to uphold such regulations on other grounds. St. Louis Gunning
Advertising Co. v. St. Louis2 1 is the landmark Missouri decision upholding
billboard advertisement regulations. In that case, the Missouri court while
specifically disapproving the regulation on aesthetic grounds, upheld the
ordinance because the signs were a threat to health, safety, and public
morals. 22 Some lower courts in other states in the late 1930Ys and early
1940's began to accept the idea that the police power could be used solely
for aesthetic purposes when regulating billboards. 23 In General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works,2 4 the Massachusetts Supreme Court clearly indicated that billboards could be regulated for
aesthetic purposes alone.
In the situation found in Deimeke, involving the use of the police
power for the beautification of highways, authorities outside Missouri are
split. A recent North Carolina case held that it was unconstitutional to
prohibit the placing of scrap automobiles within 150 yards of a highway. 25
A 1959 California court of appeals decision stated that it was a valid
exercise of police power to require that a fence be placed around junkyards. However, the court went on to say that a requirement that the
fence be solid was a purely aesthetic consideration, therefore unconstitutional.26 On the other hand, in Jasper v. Commonwealth27 the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky upheld a statute requiring that the junkyard be
effectively hidden from the view of travelers. The court states that "[t]he
obvious purpose of this Act is to enhance the scenic beauty of our roadways ....-28
The Missouri cases indicate a gradual progression from complete
prohibition of the use of police power for aesthetic purposes to the present
position indicated in Deimeke. In St. Louis v. Evraiff, a 1923 case, the
Supreme Court of Missouri indicated that "regulations based on aesthetic
considerations are not in accord with the spirit of our democratic institutions." 2 9 By 1950 the court had shifted to the position that although
aesthetic values alone were not sufficient reason for the exercise of police

20. Bryan v. Chester, 212 Pa. 259, 61 A. 894 (1905).
21. 235 Mo. 99, 187 S.W. 929 (1911).
22. See also Casack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935);
New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, 10 N.Y.2d 151;'176
N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961). There are some arguments which cannot
be classified as fictions. Safety may be promoted if billboards are considered as
distracting to motorists, thereby causing accidents. However, in most of the above
cases the safety reasons given were fictions.
23. Preferred Tires v. Hempstead, 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.2d 374 (1940).
See also Commonwealth v. Trimmer, 53 Dauphin Co. Rep. 91 (Pa. 1942).
24. 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935). In this case the court upheld an
ordinance prohibiting billboards within 300 feet of a public way.
25. State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959).
26. People v. Dickinson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 872, 343 P.2d 809 (1959).
27. 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964).
28. Id. at 711.
29. 301 Mo. 231, 250, 256 S.W. 489, 495 (En Banc 1923).
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power, they would be considered when other reasons were present.30 Finally,
in Deimeke the court has now taken a further step toward allowing full
use of police power for aesthetic purposes.
The concept that police power may be used by state legislatures for
aesthetic purposes is being slowly recognized by the judiciary.3 1 No doubt
this development will continue. However, continued expansion of this
concept will also affect other levels of government. No doubt the courts
will soon be called upon to determine the powers of municipalities to regulate in these areas.
In most states, including Missouri, all cities are vested by statute with
authority to enact and enforce zoning ordinances.3 2 However, the extent
to which a municipality may regulate for aesthetic purposes is far from
clear. There is no doubt that the police power may be used to encourage
the appropriate use of land within a community.83 Some decisions have
upheld the right of municipalities to require that new structures in certain districts be in conformity with existing structures. Although aesthetics
was a consideration in these decisions, they were based primarily on the
rationale of maintaining neighborhood property values.34 A few courts
have even condoned the exercise of municipal police power for purely
aesthetic considerations.3 5
In the recent Missouri case of State ex rel. Magidson v. Henze3 6
involving the power of a municipality to impose aesthetic standards in the
erection of houses, the St. Louis Court of Appeals struck down a municipal
ordinance on the grounds that Missouri statutes3 7 did not grant the city
the right to use its police power for such a purpose. Therefore, even if the
Missouri Supreme Court in Deimeke has accepted the proposition that
police power may be used for purely aesthetic considerations, there is
some question as to whether Missouri municipalities have been authorized
30. St. Louis v. Friedman, 358 Mo. 681, 216 S.W.2d 475 (1948).
31. Billboard regulation is allowed in almost all states; junkyard regulation
is allowed in a minority of the states.
32. Section 89.010, RSMo 1969, allows a city to pass zoning ordinances to
promote health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community. Section
89.040, RSMo 1959 provides that:
such regulation shall be made with reasonable consideration, among
other things, to the character of the district and its particular suitability
for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings
and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such
municipality.
See Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HtAv. L. REv.
1622333.0962).
4. State v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955). The ordinance
required that the village building regulations board find that the new structure
did not vary substantially from existing structures in the neighborhood. Reid v.
Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio 1963). The board rejected the
plans on the grounds that they did not maintain a high character of community
development nor did they conform to the character of the houses in that
community.
35. Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255 (Ore.' 1965). This case held that
an ordinance wholly excluding junkyards from a city was a valid exercise of
police power.
36. 342 S.W.2d 261, 266 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
37. § 89.020, RSMo (1969).
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to regulate the design and appearance of homes and other buildings.
Moreover, the court indicated in dicta that even if the city could legislate
for aesthetic purposes, the ordinance would be void because "it lacks 'uniformity of application' in accordance with some standards contained within
itself."38 The St. Louis Court of Appeals seemed reluctant to leave decisions of what is, or is not, beautiful in the hands of local officials. One
might easily conclude that for any ordinance to be upheld, it would have
to be based on an objective standard which eliminates any possibility of
caprice or bias on the part of those chosen to enforce it.
Conduct offensive to the senses of hearing and smell may be validly
regulated under police power. 39 There seems to be no valid reason supporting a different rule concerning the sense of sight.4 ° Although the right of
an individual to use his property as he sees fit should not be unreasonably
denied, regulations productive of benefits for the entire community should
not be invalidated merely because they arise from aesthetic considerations.
The Deimeke case clearly indicates that aesthetic considerations will be
given great weight in determining the validity of future regulations. The
courts now have the task of determining what standards should be applied
in deciding whether an aesthetic regulation is valid.
DARYL

N.

SNADON

THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY IS REBUTTABLE?
Rasco v. Rascol
On March 21, 1965, the parties in this case separated and, with the
exception of five days in June of 1965, remained separated. On December
30, nine months and nine days after separation, William Dean was born.
Plaintiff wife sued for divorce, and defendant filed a cross bill praying
for divorce on grounds of wife's adultery and for an adjudication that
William Dean was illegitimate. Plaintiff denied having committed adultery.
Defendant's only evidence consisted of (1) his testimony that in March of
1965, while looking through a dresser drawer, he discovered a wet diaphragm contraceptive, (2) testimony of a fellow employee of plaintiff
that he had seen her seated in the car of another male employee one
evening on the outskirts of St. Joseph, Missouri, (3) testimony of defendant's
sister-in-law that plaintiff had engaged in an affair some eight years prior
to trial, and (4) testimony of Dr. Richard Rydell, M.D., a pathologist
who had conducted blood grouping tests on plaintiff, defendant, and
William Dean that, based upon the results of these tests, to a reasonable
medical certainty, defendant was not the father of William Dean. The
38. State ex rel. Magidson v. Henze, 342 S.W.2d 261, 266 (St. L. Mo. App.

1961).

39. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
40. Id.

1. 447 S.W.2d 10 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
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trial court, sitting without a jury, found in favor of defendant, granting
the divorce, declaring William Dean to be plaintiff's illegitimate son, and
granting custody of three minor children to defendant. Because William
Dean was found to be illegitimate, no provision was made for child support payments from defendant. Plaintiff moved for a new trial alleging
error in the custody award to the defendant. The motion was denied, and
plaintiff appealed on the issue of custody only. No argument as to the
legitimacy of William Dean nor liability of the defendant for child support was submitted by plaintiff on appeal.
Upon appeal, the Kansas City Court of Appeals held that the trial
court's finding of illegitimacy "represents a miscarriage of justice which
can only lead to manifest injustice to all concerned." 2 Furthermore, "in
exceptional circumstances, the appellate courts can correct obvious errors
although the parties do not urge such points in their brief[s]." The court,
therefore, reversed on the issue of the illegitimacy and child support payments of William Dean but affirmed on the issue of custody.4
The main obstacle to a determination that William Dean was illegitimate is the common law presumption that issue born or conceived during
the term of a valid marriage is legitimate.5 Originally this presumption of
legitimacy, or rule of quator maria, was held to be conclusive unless the
husband could prove that he was either impotent or beyond "the four
seas of England" during the probable time of conception. 6 Some authorities went so far as to require that this condition, or absence, persist
throughout the period of gestation.7 Later, the rule was modified to allow
a rebuttal of the presumption when the husband could establish "nonaccess" or actual absence which prevented any sexual intercourse with the
wife during the period of probable conception. 8 However, actual absence
was necessary, since at common law, if a man and a woman were married
and had access to one another, they were presumed to be engaging in
sexual intercourse. 9 Today in jurisdictions allowing rebuttal, it appears
that the presumption may be rebutted by any competent evidence establishing the husband's sterility throughout the period of possible conception,1 0 his failure to have sexual intercourse with his wife during the
2. Id. at 15-16.
3. Id. at 15.
4. Id. at 18.
5. Id. at 16.

6. Nelson v. Jones, 245 Mo. 579, 594, 151 S.W. 80, 84 (En Banc 1912);
Needham v. Needham, 299 S.W. 832, 834 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927).
7. J. HUBBACK, SUCCESSION 393 (1844). Following this rationale, a court of
the highest jurisdiction found that a child born in England was legitimate even
though the husband had been in Ireland throughout the entire term of pregnancy
and for some time previously, simply because Ireland was within the King's
dominion or "four seas." 7 AM. JuR. Bastards § 14.
8. Stripe v. Meffert, 287 Mo. 366, 392, 229 S.W. 762, 771 (1921); Note, 23
WAsH. 9:LEE L. REv. 411, 413 (1966). As was pointed out in Rasco, 447 S.W.2d
at 17, the period of gestation in Missouri has been held to vary from seven to
eleven months. Thus, it would be necessary to establish non-access throughout a
period of possible conception corresponding to this varying period of gestation.
F--v. F----, 333 S.W.2d 320, 327 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
9. J. HUBBACK, supra note 7, at 398.
10. Note, 20 STAN. L. Rrv. 754 (1968).
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period of possible conception," 12or as in Missouri, any other evidence
tending to preclude his paternity.
The more serious problem today is determining what quantum of evidence is necessary to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. An understanding of the reasons underlying the existence of the presumption is necessary
to fully understand the strict requirements of proof. These reasons are:
(1) "broad principles of natural justice: the supposed virtue of the mother,
and the protection of innocent offspring from the odium and disabilities
of bastardy,"' 3 (2) preservation of the integrity of the family,14 and (3)
the preference of the courts for support provided by the husband rather
than by the state. 15 When these reasons are coupled with the fact that,
prior to the discovery of the exclusionary results of blood grouping tests,
there was no competent evidence to establish non-paternity where husband
and wife had been cohabiting, it is easy to understand why the courts
used the presumption of legitimacy as a substitute for a finding of paternity.16 Thus, in setting forth the quantum of proof necessary for rebuttal, the
courts began to coin phrases such as: "the presumption of legitimacy is
the strongest presumption known to law,"' 7 the presumption is rebutted
only when "clear and convincing evidence" to the contrary is presented,' 8
the presumption is rebutted only when there is "no judicial escape from
that dire conclusion,"' 9 or "the presumption will not fail unless common
sense and reason are outraged by a holding that it abides." 20 The Missouri
11. Ash v. Modem Sand & Gravel Co., 234 Mo. App. 1195, 1206, 122 S.W.2d

45, 51 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938).
12. Underwood v. Underwood, 399 S.W.2d 635, 637 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966);
Boudinier v. Boudinier, 240 Mo. App. 278, 293, 203 S.W.2d 89, 98 (K.C. Ct. App.
1947).
13. Simpson v. Blackburn, 414 S.W.2d 795, 800 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
This reason was cited in Rasco, 447 S.W.2d at 16, and appears to have weighed
heavily in the minds of the court. It should be noted, however, that the
disabilities attaching to bastardy have been substantially reduced in recent years
under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. An illegitimate child may now recover for the wrongful death of his parent. Glona v.
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levi v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968). Citing these cases, the Missouri Supreme Court has held that
denial of child support on grounds of illegitimacy constitutes a denial of equal
v. R - , 431 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. 1968). In addition, a
protection. R-finding of illegitimacy in a divorce action between the parents is not binding
upon the child since the child is not a party to the suit. Oliver v. England, 48
Misc. 2d 335, 339, 264 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004 (1965).
14. Note, supra note 10, at 757.

15. Id. At common law the illegitimate child was not entitled to support

from its father but rather, was entitled to support only from its mother. Filiation

v. Rstatutes and recent holdings such as R1968), have greatly diminished the validity of this reason.

, 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo.

16. Note, supra note 10, at 756-57.

17. Bernheimer v. First Nat'l. Bank, 359 Mo. 1119, 1133, 225 S.W.2d 745,
751 (En Banc 1949); Ash v. Modem Sand & Gravel Co., 234 Mo. App. 1195, 1206,
122 S.W.2d 45, 50 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938); Needham v. Needham, 299 S.W. 832,
834 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927).
, 333 S.W.2d 320, 327 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960) ; Stripe
18. F v. Fv. Meffert, 287 Mo. 366, 392, 299 S.W. 762, 771 (1921).
19. Nelson v. Jones, 245 Mo. 579, 594, 151 S.W. 80, 84 (En Banc 1912).
20. Underwood v. Underwood, 599 S.W.2d 635, 637 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
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courts have not been entirely consistent in defining the quantum of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption.2 1 However, Rasco, in line with
these decisions appears to indicate that evidence establishing illegitimacy
must be almost conclusive.
In light of the above, the question becomes, how accurate or reliable
is the evidence of blood grouping tests excluding paternity such as offered
in Rasco?2 2 Today there are four basic blood grouping tests which may
be performed: ABO, MN, Rh, and P. Since each of the tests isolates for
comparison a different characteristic in the subjects' blood, it is possible
that the result will be exclusionary as to one test but not as to others or,
conversely, exclusionary as to more than one test.23 At a medical convention
in Copenhagen, Denmark in 1952, the accuracy of exclusionary results
under each of these tests was calculated to be over 99.99% for the ABO
and MN tests, and about 99.9%, for the Rh and P tests. 2 4 Where, however,
paternity is excluded by more than one test, the statistical probability of
25
error may decrease to as little as one in every one hundred billion cases.
The medical profession readily admits that exceptions to the laws
of genetics, upon which the blood grouping tests are based, will occur.2 6
This is probably why Dr. Rydell in Rasco refused to testify that the paternity of defendant was impossible.27 Because medical experts refuse to characterize blood test exclusionary results as absolutely infallible, and because judges usually do not have personal knowledge of the genetic
theories involved, there has been a hesitancy among the courts to accept
these exclusionary results as competent evidence of illegitimacy.28 This
hesitancy, as demonstrated in Rasco, continues to exist even though exclu-

21. Simpson v. Blackburn, 414 S.W.2d 795, 802 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
22. By way of introduction, the blood grouping tests simply consist of
comparisons of samples of blood taken from the mother, the child, and the
putative father. Since the identification of the mother and child are known, it
is possible to predict, through the use of the laws of genetics, what possible
characteristics must have been present in the blood of the father such that when
combined with the characteristics of the mother's blood they yielded the
characteristics present in the child's blood. Should the putative father fall
within one of the possible blood groups, evidence so indicating is generally
held inadmissable since any other man having the possible characteristics could
also conceivably be the father. However, where the putative father's blood is
such that when it is genetically combined with the blood of the mother it could
not yield characteristics present in the child's blood, the results of blood grouping
tests will clearly reveal the impossibility of biological paternity. For a detailed
explanation of the mechanics, use, and accuracy of blood grouping tests see
S. SCHATKIN, DIsPUTED PATERNrrY PROCEEDINGS (4th ed. 1967).

23. Note, supra note 8, at 417.
24. Ross, The Value of Blood Tests in Paternity Cases, 71 HARv. L. Rv.
466, 468 (1958). There is some difference of opinion as to the exact statistical
accuracy of exclusionary results of properly conducted blood grouping tests.
According to Davidsohn, Levine & Wiener, Medicolegal Application of Blood
Grouping Tests, 149 J.A.M.A. 699, 703 (1952), the theoretical probability of error
on all tests is approximately 1:50,000 to 1:100,000.
25. Note, supra note 8, at 417.
26. Id.
27. 447 S.W.2d at 13.
28. Ross, supra note 24, at 467.
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sionary results of blood tests are more reliable than evidence obtained from
29
the narration of a witness.
Courts admitting exclusionary results of blood grouping tests treat
such evidence in two separate ways. Some courts hold that exclusionary
results are expert opinion only and are to be accorded whatever weight
deemed appropriate by the trier of fact.30 This position has been severely
criticized by the American Law Institute in the Preamble of the Uniform
Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity:
In paternity proceedings, divorce actions and other types of cases
in which the legitimacy of a child is in issue, the modern developments of science have made it possible to determine with certainty
in a large number of cases that one charged with being the father
of a child could not be ....
If the negative fact is established it is
evident that there is a great miscarriage of justice to permit juries
to hold on the basis of oral testimony, passion or sympathy, that
the person charged is the father and is responsible for the support
of the child and other incidents of paternity

...

The conclusion

should be final if there is no dispute among the experts. There is
no need for a dispute among the experts, and true experts will not
disagree. 3 '
Other courts, including those in states adopting the Uniform Act,
hold that the exclusionary results of properly administered blood tests
are real evidence and conclusive as to the issue of paternity. 32 According
to this view, the trier of fact determines if the blood samples were properly
secured and if the tests were properly and accurately conducted. 33 Once
the proponent of the evidence has established accurate sampling and
testing methods, the issue of paternity is concluded, even in cases where

29. Id. at 467-68.
30. H. CLARx, DoMtsTic RELATONS 171 (1968); Note 5 VILL. L. REv. 489,
491 (1960). This was the position taken by the court in Rasco, 447 S.W.2d at
17. In a lengthy, unnecessary, and irrelevant discussion of a group the court
refers to as "the scientists," the court, in effect, refuses to consider the subject
of the controversy. Rather, the issue of the accuracy and reliability of exclusionary
results of blood grouping tests is summarily decided on the untenable basis that
because years ago experts testified that "the world was flat, that man could never
fly or enter outer space, or cause a baseball to curve," experts today testifying
as to the reliability of blood grouping tests are also in error. The court concludes
its discussion by indicating that to allow the blood test evidence to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy would be to relinquish the fact-finding function of the
trier of fact to the expert. That this relinquishment as to the significance of
exclusion is undesirable does not logically follow, since the results of properly
conducted blood grouping tests are not subject to controversy. Accuracy of
properly conducted tests is unquestioned by scientific and medical authority.
"There is, in fact, no living authority of repute, medical or legal who may be
cited adversely." S. SCHATRIN, supra note 22, at 192. In addition, this relinquishment is limited since the propriety of testing methods is still subject to scrutiny
by the trier of fact, and if necessary, the results may be brought into the courtroom
and examined under a microscope by the trier of fact. S. ScHATKiN, supra, at
195.
31.

Preamble, UNIFORm AcT ON BLOOD TSrs TO DETERMINE PATERNITY.

32. H. CLARK, supra note 30, at 171.
33. Id.; Note, supra note 8, at 422.
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the presumption of legitimacy operates against the proponent.3 4 In cases
where the presumption of legitimacy does so operate, supporters of this
view argue that there is actually no reduction in the quantum of evidence
necessary for rebuttal, because in reality, exclusionary results indicate virtual impossibility of legitimacy, and this is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of proof in any jurisdiction allowing rebuttal. 35
The court in Rasco, by reversing the trial court's determination of an
issue which was not argued on appeal on the ground that to affirm illegitimacy would sanction injustice, raises serious doubt as to the quantum
of evidence now necessary for rebuttal. The decision, however, is narrow in
scope. The court has held only that exclusionary results of blood tests,
do not conclusively rebut the presumption of legitimacy when the presumption is asserted in favor of the child.3 6 An earlier case seems to indicate
that the presumption is effective only where its operation protects the
child.3 7 In any case, where the legitimacy of the child is not in issue, where
the presumption of legitimacy does not operate to protect the child, or
where the issue for which the evidence is used, such as plaintiff's adultery
in Rasco,38 does not affect the child's legitimacy, exclusionary results of
properly conducted blood tests may yet be conclusive. To hold otherwise
would defeat the goal of justice toward which the courts claim to strive.
JOHN KEAY WALLAcE, III

34. H. CLARK, supra note 30, at 171. This is the necessary result in states
having adopted the Uniform Act in its entirety. UNIFoRM AcT ON BLOOD TFsTs
TO DETERMINE PATERNITY § 5.

35. S. SCHATKIN, supra note 22, at 252.

36. Rasco v. Rasco, 447 S.W.2d 10, 18 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
37. Simpson v. Blackburn, 414 S.W.2d 795, 802 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
38. Exclusionary results of blood grouping tests will establish both nonpaternity and adultery. While Rasco indicates such evidence alone will not rebut
the presumption of legitimacy, the court did not consider the lower court's
determination that the same evidence was sufficient to establish plaintiff's adultery.
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